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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GLEN P. WILLEY, ; 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) Appeal No. 93-0205-CA 
) District Court No. 91 490 0101 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI OF GLEN P. WILLEY 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in substantially increasing the amount and 
duration of the trial court's alimony award without evidence to support the award. 
II. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by awarding an amount of attorneys' fees 
not sought by respondent and not based on any evidence in the record. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is found at Willey v. Willey, 287 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 27 (Utah App. April 4, 1996). The opinion is attached as Exhibit 1 of the Addendum. 
GROUNDS FOR SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
/ . Date of Entry of Decision. The decision of the Court of Appeals was filed on 
April 4, 1996. 
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2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The petition for writ of certiorari of 
plaintiff/petitioner Glen P. Willey ("Mr. Willey") was filed within thirty days after the entry 
of the final decision by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to rule 48(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
3. Statutory Basis for this Court's Jurisdiction. This appeal is properly before 
this Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and § 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
This case is governed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3 and § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, This is a divorce action originally filed in 1991. This current 
appeal was from an order of the trial court amending the decree of divorce on remand. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. This case was originally tried in 
November 1991. The findings of fact and conclusions of law (hereinafter "Original 
Findings"), and decree of divorce were entered on January 14, 1992 (Exhibits 2 and 3 of the 
Addendum). Defendant/respondent Rosalind Ann Johnson Willey ("Ms. Willey") appealed 
(the "First Appeal"). Willey v. Willey 866 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1993) (Exhibit 4 of the 
Addendum). In Willey, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not made the 
requisite findings on each party's needs so that alimony could be determined. The Court 
further held that the division of debt should also be considered in determining alimony. 
Ms. Willey had also asserted that the court should include the expenses of her 
children from a prior marriage in calculating alimony; the Court of Appeals rejected that 
argument. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not have sufficient evidence 
before it to impute income to Ms. Willey and invited the trial court to receive additional 
evidence on that issue. Id at 554. 
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The Court of Appeals also rejected Ms. Willey's arguments that the trial court erred 
in failing to recognize her premarital equity in the marital home, finding that the equity had 
been consumed by the parties. 
The Court of Appeals also found that the trial court's findings concerning attorneys' 
fees were inadequate and remanded for additional findings on that issue and directed the trial 
court to consider attorneys' fees on appeal. Id. 
Ms. Willey also appealed from an order of the trial court of April 5, 1993 (Exhibit 5 
of Addendum), allowing Mr. Willey to offset payment of Ms. Willey's share of the marital 
debt against his alimony obligation (the "Second Appeal"). 
After the Court of Appeals issued its original opinion on November 29, 1993, Ms. 
Willey did not seek an immediate hearing to consider the issues remanded to the trial court. 
Instead, on February 18, 1994, she filed a petition to modify the decree and a request for 
temporary support. She also served extensive interrogatories and a request for production of 
documents. Mr. Willey moved to dismiss the petition and for a protective order with respect 
to the discovery. The domestic relations commissioner stayed the petition and granted the 
motion for protective order. Ms. Willey objected to the commissioner's recommendation; 
the trial court denied the objection. 
In October of 1994, the trial court held a scheduling conference and entered a pretrial 
order (Exhibit 6 of the Addendum). The court found that the record of the original trial 
already contained sufficient evidence to determine the expenses of each party and that 
findings on that issue could be made from the record. The court directed an evidentiary 
hearing be held to determine the amount of income Ms. Willey was able to earn. 
The evidentiary hearing took place on November 17, 1994. The court heard 
testimony from a vocational evaluator and from Ms. Willey's counsel as to attorneys' fees. 
Neither party attempted to offer any other evidence. 
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On January 31, 1995, the trial court issued a detailed memorandum decision. The 
memorandum decision is attached as Exhibit 7 of the Addendum. At the court's direction, 
Mr. Willey's counsel drafted findings and conclusions to which Ms. Willey's counsel 
objected. The court entered the findings, conclusions, and order on March 7, 1995. The 
findings of fact and conclusions of law (hereinafter "Findings on Remand"), and order are 
attached as Exhibits 8 and 9 of the Addendum. Ms. Willey appealed the trial court's order of 
March 7, 1995 (the "Third Appeal"). 
On April 18, 1995, the Court of Appeals entered an order consolidating the Second 
and Third Appeals for purposes of briefing and decision. 
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on the Second and Third Appeals on April 4, 
1996, without oral argument. The Court of Appeals found that (1) the amount and duration 
of the trial court's alimony award were not equitable, and (2) the trial court failed to make 
adequate findings to support its award of attorney's fees. 
Instead of remanding the case to the trial court for further findings, the Court of 
Appeals issued its own order substantially increasing the amount and duration of the alimony 
award and making a specific attorney's fees award. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Willeys were married on April 29, 1982. Both parties had been married 
previously. (Findings on Remand nos. 1 and 2.) 
Ms. Willey had three children from her previous marriage; the parties had no children 
together. In November 1990, the parties separated after eight years of marriage. (Findings 
on Remand nos. 2-4.) 
From the time the parties separated until the time of trial in November 1991, Mr. 
Willey paid Ms. Willey monthly temporary support, which included payment of the 
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mortgage on the marital residence in the amount of $2,492, temporary alimony in the amount 
of $1,500, payment of Ms. Willey's car payment, and payment of a joint installment debt of 
$360. Ms. Willey received temporary support during this year of separation in excess of 
$4,500 per month. (Findings on Remand nos. 22 and 34) 
The original trial took place on November 21 and 22, 1991. At trial, the trial court 
found that Ms. Willey was capable of earning an income of between $1,500 and $2,000 per 
month. Ms. Willey submitted to the trial court that her monthly living expenses were $2,678. 
(Original Findings no. 12, Findings on Remand no. 17.) 
The trial court awarded Ms. Willey alimony in the amount of $1,500 per month for 
one year from the time of trial, and $1,000 per month for three years thereafter. The court 
took into account the fact that Mr. Willey had already been supporting Ms. Willey for a year 
since their separation. (Original Findings no. 12.) 
In addition to alimony of $1,500 per month for the first year, the court awarded Ms. 
Willey one-half of certain bonuses to be received by Mr. Willey. Early in 1992, Ms. Willey 
received $6,562.39, representing her portion of such a bonus. (Original Findings no. 14, 
Findings on Remand no. 35.) 
The court awarded Ms. Willey attorney's fees of $5,000, finding that the $19,215 
requested by Ms. Willey was not reasonable under the circumstances. (Original Findings no. 
22, Findings on Remand nos. 46-49.) 
After trial, Mr. Willey paid Ms. Willey alimony as ordered by the court. In addition, 
Mr. Willey continued to pay the mortgage through October 1992, until the marital residence 
was sold. Mr. Willey also paid Ms. Willey's share of the installment debt which she was 
ordered to pay pursuant to the decree of divorce. (Findings on Remand nos. 30 and 34.) 
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During 1991 and 1992, when Ms. Willey was receiving support equivalent to $4,300-
$4,500 per month, she did nothing to further her education or to obtain additional training to 
enhance her earning capacity. (Findings on Remand no. 9.) 
Mr. Willey was awarded a judgment in the amount of $18,840.86 against Ms. Willey 
for Ms. Willey's share of the joint installment debt and the deficiency resulting from the sale 
of the marital residence paid by Mr. Willey. (Order, 12, Exhibit 5 of Addendum.) The trial 
court allowed Mr. Willey to offset the amount of the judgment against the amount he would 
otherwise have been required to pay Ms. Willey. Id. Ms. Willey appealed this decision of 
the trial court. 
On remand, the trial court found that the reasonable monthly living expenses for each 
party were $2,000. The court found that Mr. Willey had satisfied joint marital debt in the 
amount of $37,681.71, of which Ms. Willey should have been responsible for half. The court 
found that Ms. Willey should not reimburse Mr. Willey for her share of the joint marital debt, 
and instead took the marital debt payment into account in fashioning the alimony award. 
(Findings on Remand nos. 21, 31-34, and 40.) 
Based on the testimony of the vocational evaluator, the court found that Ms. Willey 
had the ability to earn $1,027.09 per month. (Findings on Remand no. 11.) 
The court found that Ms. Willey had done nothing to pursue her education or to 
increase her earning capacity during the parties' separation, trial, or pending appeals. 
(Findings on Remand no. 9.) 
Based in part upon the payment of marital debt made by Mr. Willey, the court did not 
modify its original alimony award under the decree of divorce, but did award Ms. Willey an 
additional $500 per month, in addition to the cost of tuition and books, to assist her in 
furthering her education for any month she was a fully matriculated student at the University 
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of Utah or comparable university for a period of nine quarters. (Findings on Remand nos. 15 
and 16.) 
The court found that all of the attorney's fees requested by Ms. Willey were not 
reasonable and awarded Ms. Willey an additional $10,000 attorneys' fees. (Findings on 
Remand nos. 45-50.) 
The court entered its findings, conclusions, and order on March 7, 1995, and Ms. 
Willey appealed. 
Instead of remanding to the trial court for further findings, the Court of Appeals 
issued its own ruling, awarding Ms. Willey alimony in the amount of $2,240 per month from 
March 7, 1995, until March 6, 2000, unless sooner terminated or modified according to law. 
The Court of Appeals did not indicate how this amount was calculated. Willey, 287 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 30. 
The Court of Appeals also awarded Ms. Willey the additional $500 per month, in 
addition to the cost of tuition, fees, and books, for each month she is enrolled as a full-time 
student up to a maximum of nine quarters, not to extend past March 6, 2000. Id 
Finally, the Court of Appeals awarded Ms. Willey a total of $37,554.38 for attorneys' 
fees and costs incurred in connection with the trial and all three appeals. The Court of 
Appeals did not explain the basis for this award. Id. at 32. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ARBITRARILY 
INCREASING THE AMOUNT AND DURATION OF MS. 
WILLEY'S ALIMONY AWARD 
In its original findings, the trial court imputed income to Ms. Willey of $l,500-$2,000 
per month. Ms. Willey claimed expenses of $2,678 per month. The trial court awarded her 
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alimony of $1,500 per month for one year and $1,000 per month for three years thereafter. 
Ms. Willey was also awarded one-half of any bonuses received by Mr. Willey. 
After the First Appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court for additional 
findings with respect to the reasonable financial needs of the parties and the imputation of 
income to Ms. Willey. After a hearing, the trial court issued a detailed memorandum 
decision containing such findings. The trial court found Ms. Willey's monthly living 
expenses to be $2,000, imputed income to Ms. Willey of $1,027.09, kept the original alimony 
award in place, and added an additional $500 per month for nine academic quarters, in 
addition to the cost of tuition and books, for rehabilitative alimony. 
On the Second and Third Appeals, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court again 
did not make adequate findings and issued its own ruling on the amount and duration of 
alimony, but without factual findings. 
The standard of review for a trial court's award of alimony is abuse of discretion. 
Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court's award of alimony 
will not be disturbed absent a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Chambers v. 
Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992). The Court of Appeals should not overturn a trial 
court's alimony ruling as long as the court supports its ruling with adequate findings and 
exercises its discretion according to the proper standards. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 491 
(Utah App. 1991). 
Upon its second review, the Court of Appeals posed three questions with regard to the 
trial court's award of alimony to Ms. Willey: First, whether the trial court erred in imputing 
income to Ms. Willey; second, whether the trial court erred in determining the parties' 
expenses; and third, whether the trial court erred in fashioning Ms. Willey's rehabilitative 
alimony award. 
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With regard to the imputation of income, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court 
properly imputed income to Ms. Willey of $1,027.09 per month and said "[w]e do not disturb 
these findings on appeal." Willey, 287 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28. 
With regard to Ms. Willey's monthly living expenses, the Court of Appeals held that 
the trial court's finding that Ms. Willey's monthly living expenses were $2,000 was 
"speculative." This holding is difficult to understand based on detailed findings by the trial 
court, which in turn were based on testimony and evidence contained in the original trial 
record. Exhibit 36-D, R. 440-42 (attached hereto as Exhibit 10 of the Addendum). The 
Court of Appeals apparently rejected the trial court's adjustments to the amount of expenses 
claimed and held that the amount of expenses submitted to the court at the time of trial was 
the amount to be used for Ms. Willey's monthly living expenses. That amount was $2,678. 
Notwithstanding this ruling, however, the Court of Appeals awarded Ms. Willey alimony of 
$2,240 per month for five additional years from March 7, 1995, until March 6, 2000. 
With regard to the rehabilitative alimony award, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court's award to Ms. Willey of an additional $500 per month while she is a fully matriculated 
student, plus the cost of tuition and books, for a period equal to nine academic quarters to be 
completed within five years. However, the Court of Appeals held that this rehabilitative 
alimony award should coincide with its new alimony award for a period of five years. 
Apparently, the Court of Appeals intended its "new" alimony award of $2,240 per 
month to have a duration concurrent with the trial court's $500 per month award, which is 
tied to Ms. Willey's furthering her education. However, the trial court did not award $500 
per month for five years; rather, it awarded $500 per month for nine quarters-a few months 
more than two years, if Ms. Willey chooses to be a student. Ms. Willey has five years in 
The Court of Appeals said that the trial court considered a "stipulated" statement of the parties' reasonable 
monthly expenditures. This is inaccurate. The trial court used the evidence submitted by Ms. Willey at the 
original trial to determine her expenses. (Findings on Remand nos. 17 and 19.) 
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which to complete her 2+ years of education. Clearly, the duration of the Court of Appeals' 
award lacked any basis in the trial court's findings or in the evidence. 
Further, the Court of Appeals approved the trial court's imputation of income to Ms. 
Willey of $1,027.09 per month. Thus, if Ms. Willey does not attend school, she does not 
need $2,240 per month in alimony to meet her needs whether her expenses are $2,240, 
$2,000, or $2,678. In order to justify its award of alimony, the Court of Appeals would have 
had to limit the time during which Mr. Willey is required to pay $2,240 to those months 
during which Ms. Willey attends school. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals ignored the fact that Ms. Willey had already received 
alimony for more than four years and that she failed to take any steps to improve her earning 
capacity during that time. Under the findings of the trial court, Ms. Willey's income, 
together with alimony for the years November 1991 through 1995, was adequate to meet her 
reasonable expenses. (Findings on Remand no. 13). In addition, as the trial court pointed 
out, Mr. Willey made the mortgage payment for the parties' home through October of 1992, 
which decreased Ms. Willey's expenses for that time period. The Court of Appeals also 
ignored the fact that Ms. Willey received $6,562.39 in 1992 as additional alimony, as a share 
of Mr. Willey's bonus. 
It is important to note that this was a second marriage for both parties. Ms. Willey 
was already the mother of three children before her marriage to Mr. Willey and had 
supported herself. She has a college degree and, as the trial court found, she could have 
obtained a teaching certificate within one year and enhanced her earning capacity in that 
manner. Within two years, Ms. Willey could have enhanced her earning capacity somewhere 
between $9.58 and $12.41 per hour, had she furthered her education to become a marketing 
expert or social worker. (Findings on Remand no. 14.) 
It is clear that the Court of Appeals simply disagreed with the trial court's findings. 
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[A] party seeking to overturn the trial court's findings has the burden of 
marshaling the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrating 
that, despite such evidence, the findings are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991). In this case, the Court of Appeals 
has simply ignored the evidence supporting the findings of fact and ignored Ms. Willey's 
failure to marshal the evidence supporting them and substituted its own judgment for that of 
the trial court. "Although [an appellate] court may fashion its own remedy as a substitute for 
the judgment of the trial court in equity cases, [it should] not disturb the trial court's 
judgment only where necessary to prevent manifest injustice." (Citations omitted.) MacKay 
v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995). It is obvious in this case that the Court of Appeals 
thought that its new award of alimony was preventing manifest injustice. However, it is 
difficult to see why it is manifest injustice for a trial court to award alimony for a period of 
four years after trial in a case where the parties lived together for only eight years and where 
the marriage was a second marriage for both parties. As the trial court found, Ms. Willey 
was healthy and extremely intelligent. She has not offered any reason why she could not 
have become rehabilitated and self-supporting within the time period during which she 
originally received alimony. 
The Court of Appeals has not indicated what evidence provided the basis for its award 
of alimony. According to the reasoning of the Court's opinion, there would have had to have 
been a finding of what Ms. Willey's reasonable expenses were in order to justify the award of 
alimony. According to Ms. Willey, her expenses were $2,678.41 per month. However, the 
Court of Appeals did not award that amount to her. The Court of Appeals accused the trial 
court of making factual findings without basis in the evidence. However, the implied factual 
findings on which the Court of Appeals' decision rests have no basis in the evidence. 
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In arriving at its award, the Court of Appeals criticized the trial court for imposing 
"speculation in the adjudicatory process" by finding Ms. Willey's monthly living expenses to 
be $2,000. The Court of Appeals held that the correct amount to use for Ms. Willey's 
monthly living expenses was the amount submitted at the time of trial, $2,678. The Court of 
Appeals then set Ms. Willey's alimony award at $2,240, with no explanation as to how it 
arrived at that figure. In essence, the Court of Appeals did exactly what it criticized the trial 
court for doing-arbitrarily set an alimony amount without any factual findings that provide 
support for such an award. 
In contrast, the trial court's award was based on detailed findings. The court 
specifically said Ms. Willey testified at trial that her monthly expenses were $2,678.41 
(Findings on Remand no. 17). The court found that: 
[Defendant's automobile expense of $381.83 is unreasonably high and should 
be reduced to $300 per month. Also, defendant's monthly unreimbursed 
medical/dental expenses of $660 per month are unreasonably high and should 
be reduced to $60 per month. While the record shows that defendant had 
major surgery in the fall of 1991, there is nothing in the record to establish 
why the ongoing expenses should continue on a monthly basis. 
(Findings on Remand no. 19.) A trial court can properly reduce the amount of expenses 
claimed. Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah App. 1991). It is difficult to 
determine what additional findings of fact the trial court could have made to support its 
conclusion that Ms. Willey's reasonable monthly expenses were $2,000 per month. The 
Court of Appeals did not explain in any manner its conclusion that the alimony should be set 
at $2,240 per month. This does not coincide with the amount of monthly expenses found by 
the trial court nor with what Ms. Willey asserted her monthly expenses were. It appears that 
it is the Court of Appeals' award that is based on "improper speculation," not that of the trial 
court. 
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The Court of Appeals also extended the underlying alimony award for five years. In 
making this decision, the Court of Appeals found that the underlying and rehabilitative 
alimony awards should coincide. This finding ignores the alimony already received by Ms. 
Willey since 1990. The trial court purposely did not extend the underlying alimony award 
for the same period of time as the additional rehabilitative alimony awarded. The reason for 
this was based on the excess support received by Ms. Willey during the separation and during 
the first year after the divorce, together with Mr. Willey's payment of substantial joint marital 
debt. 
The record clearly establishes that during the year the parties were separated, Mr. 
Willey paid Ms. Willey $1,500 in temporary support, in addition to paying the house 
payment of $2,492 per month, joint marital installment debt of $360 per month, and Ms. 
Willey's car payment. After the trial in November of 1991, Mr. Willey paid Ms. Willey 
alimony, in addition to paying the house payment until October 1992, when the home was 
sold. In addition, in early 1992, Ms. Willey received $6,562.39 as her share of Mr. Willey's 
bonus. In late 1992, Mr. Willey paid over $37,000 of joint marital debt. Accordingly, for 
two years, Ms. Willey received support in excess of her established needs. During that two 
year period, Ms. Willey did nothing to obtain additional training or education or to help 
increase her earning potential. 
The Court of Appeals stated that both awards should continue for five years because 
the trial court found that it was reasonable for rehabilitative alimony to continue for a period 
of five years. This is not accurate. In setting the additional $500 per month rehabilitative 
alimony, the trial court did not say that such an award should continue for five years. The 
court awarded this amount for a period not to exceed nine quarters to be completed at an 
educational institution within five years. This does not mean that Ms. Willey would receive 
the rehabilitative alimony award for the full five years. 
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The net effect of the Court of Appeals' award is to reward Ms. Willey for doing 
nothing to increase her earning potential by doubling the amount of alimony awarded to her 
for a period double the time originally ordered and to penalize Mr. Willey who paid the 
original award. Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals' award of alimony and the 
duration of that alimony constitutes error, and the decision of the Court of Appeals should be 
reversed. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY ARBITRARILY 
INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF MS. WILLEY'S 
ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD. 
At trial, Ms. Willey submitted evidence requesting attorney's fees in the amount of 
$19,215 for 128.1 hours on the case billed at $150 per hour. The reasonableness of these fees 
was challenged by Mr. Willey. The trial court found those fees to be unreasonable, stating 
that combined attorneys' fees of $31,000 to $32,000 was an unfortunate use of funds. At 
trial, the court awarded Ms. Willey $5,000 attorney's fees. On appeal, the Court remanded 
the case to the trial court for additional findings with respect to the award of attorneys' fees. 
On remand, the trial court made specific findings concerning the attorneys' fees at 
issue. Specifically, the trial court found that "[a] great problem is encountered when the fees 
are greatly out of proportion to the marital estate and the present and future financial 
circumstances of the parties." (Memorandum Decision, Exhibit 7 of Addendum.) The court 
entered the following specific findings with respect to the issue of attorneys' fees: 
41. With respect to the issue of the reasonableness of attorneys' 
fees, the court notes that the district court's file is contained in two large 
volumes. There are seven pages of docket entries describing pleadings and 
filing activity. There have been sixteen court appearances in District Court 
alone, in addition to the activity in the Court of Appeals. 
42. With respect to unusual or particular issues of law, defendant 
argued that plaintiff had a continuing obligation to pay support for her 
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children from a prior marriage. This assertion was rejected by the trial court 
and the Court of Appeals. 
44. In applying the factors to be considered in making an award of 
attorney's fees, the court finds that this case was not and should not have been 
particularly difficult. It was a relatively routine divorce of a couple with 
extreme financial difficulties and disagreements on how to manage their 
incomes and expenses. 
45. The court further finds that the efficiency of the attorneys in 
handling the case was not good and the reasonableness of the number of hours 
is excessive and beyond a reasonable evaluation of the case. 
47. While defendant's attorney does not request payment for all 
recorded hours, he does request payment for 101 hours in the amount of 
$15,150.00 for fees and costs of $1,539.38 for a total of $16,689.38. This 
amount is presumably in addition to the $5,000.00 already paid by plaintiff for 
defendant's attorney's fees after the trial. 
49. However, the amount of attorneys' fees charged in this case, 
considering the marital estate, cannot justify the fees incurred. The parties' 
net worth approached zero and the only meaningful asset was the plaintiffs 
earning capacity which he brought into the marriage. The court finds that the 
entire financial condition of the parties cannot justify combined attorneys' fees 
in excess of $65,000, with little or no marital property remaining. 
Accordingly, the court finds the fees are not reasonable. 
The trial court found that Ms. Willey did not have the ability to pay attorney's fees, 
but that Mr. Willey did. Accordingly, the court found that an additional $10,000 was a 
reasonable amount to be awarded for attorney's fees. 
A trial court's award of attorneys' fees should not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion. Bell, 810 P.2d 489. The trial court has broad discretion in awarding attorneys' 
fees. Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991). Factors to be taken into 
account in such an award are the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the 
other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. Bell, 810 P.2d at 493. The 
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trial court is encouraged to "make findings to explain the factors which they considered 
relevant in arriving at an attorney fee award." Id. at 494 (citations omitted). 
Upon its second review, the Court of Appeals stated that the trial court again failed to 
make the necessary findings regarding attorneys' fees. It is difficult to imagine what 
additional findings as to reasonableness the trial court could have made to satisfy the Court of 
Appeals. The trial court was not required to award all of the attorney's fees Ms. Willey 
requested. Utah law does not require that; instead, it allows and requires the trial court to 
assess reasonableness of the fees in making its award. Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 
1984). The trial court properly did so in this case. 
The trial court examined the court's files, considered Ms. Willey's insistence upon 
arguing a position on which she was unlikely to prevail, the difficulty of the litigation, the 
efficiency of the attorneys, and the reasonableness of the number of hours. It was clearly in 
the discretion of the trial court to award attorneys' fees which it found were reasonable, based 
on all of the facts and circumstances of the case with which it was familiar. The trial court 
properly reduced the attorney's fees requested on remand from $16,689.38 to $10,000. 
The Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's award of attorney's fees and, without 
explanation, awarded Ms. Willey a total of $36,015 in attorneys' fees, plus $1,539.38 in 
costs, to cover fees and costs incurred at trial, remand, and on all the appeals. This amount 
appears to have no relationship to the amount claimed by Ms. Willey for the trial~$19,215, 
or for the proceedings on remand-$ 16,689.38, or to the amount she might have claimed for 
the appeal. Instead, this is the total of all fees Ms. Willey claimed to have incurred between 
the trial and the remand hearing. Ms. Willey did not even request that the court award this 
amount because it included many other proceedings, such as her petition to modify. She 
requested only $16,689.38 for the remand proceedings and the First Appeal. 
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It is impossible to determine from the Court of Appeals' opinion how it arrived at the 
amount of its award. The Court of Appeals offered no analysis, as required under Bell, to 
support its award. In essence, the Court did exactly what it criticized the trial court for 
doing-awarded an arbitrary amount of attorneys' fees with no supporting evidence. 
In its remand decision, the trial court made detailed findings concerning the award of 
attorneys' fees. The Court of Appeals erred in substituting its own arbitrary determination of 
attorneys' fees for the trial court's well-supported award. The Court of Appeals said: 
The trial court should have addressed the question of whether, under all the 
relevant circumstances, Ms. Willey's attorney fees are reasonable. The factors 
identified in Bell also permit an examination of the difficulty of the litigation, 
the attorneys' efficiency, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on 
the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality, the amount involved in 
the case and the result obtained, and the expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved. 
Willey, 866 P.2d at 555. 
In this case, the trial court did examine all those factors in its findings of fact nos. 41 
through 51. The Court of Appeals said: 
The critical determination to be made here is not the overall efficiency 
of attorneys for both parties, but whether or not the fees sought by Ms. Willey 
are reasonable under the circumstances of this case. 
Willey, 287 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. 
The trial court made exactly that determination in reducing Ms. Willey's claimed fees 
to $10,000. The Court of Appeals offered absolutely no rationale, justification, or calculation 
of its award of $36,015, an amount not even claimed by Ms. Willey. The Court of Appeals 
did not explain why that amount should cover the Second and Third Appeals or how it 
increased or reduced the total fees claimed for the various proceedings to the amount 
awarded. 
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Because the Court of Appeals' attorney's fees award was arbitrary and unsupported 
by evidence, the award should be reversed. The award flies in the face of the well-
established Utah law that attorneys' fees awards must be supported by specific findings and 
replaces it with the theory that the Court of Appeals can arbitrarily award attorneys' fees 
without explanation. 
CONCLUSION 
In its decision in this case, the Court of Appeals has done exactly what it chastised the 
trial court for doing—entered awards of alimony and attorney's fees that have no relationship 
to the evidence presented. The findings of fact made by the trial court support its decision 
with respect to alimony and attorney's fees. There are no findings of fact and, in fact, no 
evidence in the record that would support the Court of Appeals' substitution of its own 
awards of alimony and attorney's fees for the trial court's. 
The decision by this panel of the Court of Appeals conflicts with prior 
pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals with respect to alimony and 
attorneys' fees. The Court of Appeals has taken the position that it may substitute its own 
judgment for that of the trial court without relying on the findings of fact of the trial court, or 
pointing to any evidence which supports its new awards. In this way, the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision that departs from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings in such a way as to invoke an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of 
supervision. 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Willey's petition for writ of certiorari should be 
granted. 
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WILKINS, Judge: 
This case has been before us previously on 
appeal. 
Because the trial court failed to make 
adequate findings of fact, we remand[ed] for 
the entry of appropriate findings, and a 
reassessment of the awards in light of those 
findings and our opinion, on (1) the award 
of alimony, (2) the allocation of debt, and 
(3) the award of attorney fees at trial and on 
appeal. We otherwise affirm[ed] [the trial 
court's prior decision]. 
Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 556 (Utah App. 
1993) (hereinafter Willey I). Ms. Willey again 
challenges the proceedmgs m the trial court. We 
reverse and remand for the entry of an amended 
decree as herein described. 
BACKGROUND 
The factual background of this case is 
well-described m Willey I. For our purposes, we 
add only those facts and events necessary to 
review the trial court's actions on remand 
pursuant to our directions m Willey I. 
In Willey /, we held that the trial court failed 
to enter sufficient fmdmgs of fact in determining 
Ms Willey's alimony award. Therefore, we 
remanded this case and directed the trial court to 
review the evidence and enter fmdmgs sufficient 
for us to review its determinations regarding the 
mcome imputed to Ms Willey, the tuning and 
amount of Ms Willey's rehabilitative alimony 
award, the allocation of the parties' debts, and 
the basis for Ms Willey's limited award of 
attorney fees at trial Willey /, 866 P.2d at 
550-51, 554-56. We also directed the trial court 
to determine and award to Ms Willey the 
attorney fees she incurred m the Willey I appeal 
Id. at 556. 
On remand, the trial court took additional 
evidence limited to Ms Willey's ability to earn 
mcome. The court declined to allow discovery 
of or testimony regarding Mr. Willey's 
then-current ability to pay support or attorney 
fees for Ms. Willey The court also declined to 
allow evidence of Ms. Willey's then-current 
ability to pay her attorney fees. Instead, the trial 
court chose to rely upon evidence received at 
trial regarding the parties' financial abilities. 
Based upon the review ordered by this court 
and the additional evidence presented below, the 
trial court entered additional fmdmgs of fact on 
some of the issues we directed it to address by 
our remand order, but failed to address others. 
The trial court revised the award of alimony, 
considered the allocation of debt, and partially 
addressed the questions raised regarding attorney 
fees. 
ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
Ms. Willey again challenges the adequacy of 
the trial court's findings regarding alimony. 
Specifically, she claims the trial court failed to 
enter adequate fmdmgs regarding the duration of 
alimony, resulting m an arbitrary termination of 
that award. She also claims the trial court 
entered findings of fact unsupported by the 
evidence, resultmg m incorrect calculation and 
consideration of alimony amounts. 
Ms. Willey also claims the trial court abused 
its discretion by prohibiting her from gomg 
forward on a petition to modify the decree and 
m denymg her request for discovery during the 
course of the proceedmgs on remand. 
In addition, Ms. Willey raises by a separate 
but now consolidated appeal the question of 
whether Mr. Willey may offset a post-decree 
judgment entered m his favor and against Ms. 
Willey, which arose from the allocation of the 
marital debts, against his alimony obligation. 
Finally, Ms. Willey also claims the trial court 
failed to make and enter the findings required by 
our holdmg m Willey I regarding the award of 
attorney fees incurred at trial and attorney fees 
on appeal, resultmg m an insufficient award of 
fees. 
ANALYSIS 
We are troubled by the mcomplete resolution 
of the issues raised m our remand order. Parties 
to a divorce proceeding are rarely well-served 
by repeated examination of the same issues. This 
is particularly true m a case such as this, where 
the financial resolution of the marital affairs 
produces a loss for both parties To permit the 
dispute to contmue is an injustice to the parties 
Moreover, 
[w]e approach the problem here presented m 
full awareness of the standard rules which 
favor the fmdmgs, judgments and decrees of 
the trial court, particularly m divorce 
matters. Notwithstanding this, the right of 
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review on appeal has its purposes. . . . 
[This court] would be remiss in its 
responsibility and this assured right of 
appeal would be meaningless if it 
unquestioningly accepted all actions of the 
trial court and remained insensitive to pleas 
to rectify inequity or injustice. 
Consequently, the rule is that when it is 
made to appear that the court has failed to 
correctly apply principles of law or equity, 
. . or that the judgment has so failed to do 
equity that it manifests a clear abuse of 
discretion, this court on review will take 
appropriate corrective action in the mterests 
of justice. 
Watson v. Watson, 561 P.2d 1072, 1073-74 
(Utah 1977) (footnotes omitted). 
I. Alimony 
Ms Willey has raised three questions that we 
agree must be addressed to resolve what alimony 
award should be mcluded m the original divorce 
decree. First, we consider whether the trial 
court erred m imputing income to Ms. Willey. 
Second, we address whether the trial court erred 
m determining the parties' expenses. Finally, we 
examme whether the trial court erred m 
fashioning Ms. Willey's rehabilitative alimony 
award "We will not overturn a trial court's 
alimony ruling as long as the court supports its 
ruling with adequate findings and exercises its 
discretion according to the standards we have 
set." Willey /, 866 P.2d at 550. We review the 
trial court's conclusions of law with respect to 
alimony awards for correctness, but we will not 
reverse the court's findings of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Breinholt v Breinholty 
905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah App. 1995). 
A. Income imputed to Ms. Willey, 
On remand, we instructed the trial court to 
review the question of how much mcome should 
be imputed to Ms. Willey, if any. Willey /, 866 
P 2d at 554. The trial court took additional 
evidence on this question by admitting a 
vocational counselor's testimony regarding her 
evaluation of Ms Willey The trial court then 
entered fmdmgs of fact imputmg monthly 
income to Ms. Willey of $958.08 for 1992, 
$991 61 for 1993, $1,026.32 for 1994, and 
$1,062.24 for 1995 These fmdmgs were 
premised upon the following evidence: at the 
time of trial, Ms. Willey was employed 
part-time at the rate of $5.00 per hour in a job 
for which there were no full-time positions 
available; Ms. Willey had previously worked 
part-time m a clothing store m trade for 
clothing; the vocational evaluator's testimony 
that Ms. Willey was capable of obtaining 
full-time employment at an average rate of $5.32 
per hour; and the vocational evaluator's 
testimony that Ms. Willey could expect a 3.5 
percent mcrease m salary each year. We do not 
disturb these fmdmgs on appeal. 
Based on this evidence, the court found that 
Ms. Willey's earning capacity at the time of trial 
was $5.90 per hour, or $1,027.09 per month if 
she worked full-time. At the time of trial Ms. 
Willey was employed only part-time. We 
therefore accept as implied the fmdmg 
apparently relied upon by the trial court that Ms. 
Willey is voluntarily underemployed, allowing 
an imputation of mcome. Because the trial court 
relied on evidence sufficiently detailed m its 
fmdmgs of fact m imputmg mcome to Ms. 
Willey, we hold that the court did not abuse its 
discretion by imputmg mcome to Ms. Willey, 
and we will not disturb the court's related 
fmdmgs. Instead, we will use the court's 
imputed mcome figures to further evaluate and 
resolve the remammg alimony questions. 
B. Reasonable financial needs of the parties. 
On remand, the trial court considered a 
stipulated statement of the parties' reasonable 
monthly expenditures. Without evidence 
regarding these stipulated expenses, the trial 
court reduced Ms. Willey's expenses by 
$678.41, for a total of $2,000.00 per month, on 
the basis of what appears to be speculation. In 
the memorandum decision on remand, the trial 
court commented that Ms. Willey's "medical 
expenses surely must not be a monthly ongomg 
amount of $660.00" and reduced them by 
$600.00 to a total of $60.00. He also reduced 
Ms. Willey's automobile expense of $381.83 by 
the unlikely amount of $78.41. These reductions 
lowered Ms. Willey's monthly expenses to an 
even $2,000.00 per month. The trial court 
likewise reduced Mr. Willey's expenses by 
$463.16 agam to reach an even $2,000.00 per 
month by reducmg the amount of Mr. Willey's 
uncontested automobile expense, without 
explanation, saymg only that Mr. Willey's 
"automobile expenses can be similarly adjusted 
down to reach a figure of $2,000.00 per month 
for him." 
The sheer absence of any evidence upon which 
to base factual findings regarding these 
adjustments makes them unacceptable. To allow 
the trial court to impose speculation on the 
adjudicatory process violates the basic premise 
upon which our judicial system is founded. All 
parties are absolutely entitled to a fair and 
impartial hearing and adjudication of their 
affairs. That did not occur m this case. We 
cannot accept the adjustments made m the 
parties' monthly expenses crafted by the trial 
court m the apparent pursuit of round numbers. 
For purposes of our correction of the divorce 
decree, we accept the amounts the parties 
submitted to the trial court as reflective of their 
reasonable financial needs at the time of trial. 
C. Rehabilitative alimony. 
It is clear from the structure of the 
alimony award that it was mtended to 
achieve a rehabilitative purpose. . . . Thus, 
the court must make realistic assessments of 
actual current mcome and actual expenses. 
The court must also consider the time 
demands and expenses of attending school. 
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Absent such an assessment and appropriate 
findings, there is no basis on which to 
determine the proper amount and duration of 
alimony needed to achieve a rehabilitative 
outcome. 
Willey I, 866 P.2d at 554. 
We anticipated that on remand the trial court 
would review the facts relevant to appellant's 
rehabilitative alimony award. However, no 
evidence regarding the circumstances 
surrounding Ms Willey's pursuit of further 
education was sought by or presented to the 
court. The trial court simply reconfirmed the 
award of "additional alimony" of $500 per 
month for "a maximum of nine quarters" of 
university level education, plus the costs of 
tuition and books. Mr. Willey is to pay all of 
this to Ms. Willey, "provided such education is 
completed within five years of January 1, 1995" 
or "withm five years followmg the date of this 
order," March 7, 1995. 
Unfortunately, based upon other factual 
fmdmgs made by the trial court, it is evident 
that during the course of the proceedings in both 
this court and the trial court that have followed 
entry of the original divorce decree, Ms. 
Willey's financial needs have not been met by 
the alimony she has actually received. The 
disparity is sufficient that for her to have 
pursued university level education on a full-time 
basis as contemplated by the trial court would 
likely have made her a public charge. Because 
she had not received the originally awarded 
alimony, she could not have made use of any 
"additional alimony." 
We accept the trial court's fmdmgs that 
rehabilitative alimony of $500 per month, plus 
the costs of tuition and books, for a period equal 
to that of nine academic quarters is warranted by 
the facts of this case. The court found that Ms 
Willey "could enhance her earning capacities 
through obtaining further education," and 
substantial evidence was presented to the court 
by both parties that revealed a great disparity 
between Mr. and Ms. Willey's earnings. The 
trial court also implied a finding m its 
conditional rehabilitative award that Ms. Willey 
must maintain full-time student status for such 
study to be appropriately beneficial. These 
fmdmgs sufficiently support the rehabilitative 
alimony award, and we affirm that portion of 
the decree. 
However, given the full-time nature of the 
contemplated study and the parties' mcome and 
needs, we find that the rehabilitative award also 
contemplated a concurrence in time with the 
original alimony awarded. How else may the 
rehabilitative alimony be considered "additional 
alimony9" As the trial court found, for Ms 
Willey to attend full-time study, she must be 
able to meet not only her reasonable monthly 
expenses, but also the increased costs of 
education. The trial court determined these 
increased costs to be university costs, tuition, 
books, and $500 per month, for the duration of 
the nine quarters of anticipated study. An 
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important purpose of alimony is to provide for 
reasonable monthly expenses and to prevent Ms 
Willey from becoming a public charge See 
Jones \ Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985). 
Given these factors, and m reliance upon the 
facts as found by the trial court, we hold that the 
rehabilitative alimony award shall coincide with 
the underlying alimony award, for the period 
established by the trial court as reasonable, a 
penod of five years. However, given the 
confused, and mdeed patently unfair nature of 
the prior order, under which Ms Willey was 
required to elect one award or the other, we 
extend the underlying alimony from March 7, 
1995, for a penod of five years. 
D. Alimony award to Ms. Willey. 
As we discussed m Willey I, the Utah 
Supreme Court has established a standard for 
setting alimony. See Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075. 
Under that standard, three factors must be 
considered m fashioning a reasonable alimony 
award: "[1] the financial conditions and needs of 
the [spouse seeking support]; [2] the ability of 
the [spouse seeking support] to produce a 
sufficient mcome for [himself or] herself; and 
[3] the abibty of the [payor spouse] to provide 
support." Willey I, 866 P.2d at 550 (quotmg 
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075) (alterations m 
original). We held m Willey I that the trial court 
had abused its discretion because it failed to 
consider all three of the Jones factors. Id. at 
550-51. 
This court has already recognized that the trial 
court addressed the second Jones factor in its 
original divorce decree, and we recognize that it 
agam did so on remand. See id. However, m 
Willey I, this court noted that the trial court 
"made no findings on [Ms ] Willey's financial 
need as the first Jones factor requires. Nor did 
it make fmdmgs on Mr. Willey's financial need, 
which underlying factual determination is 
required for an assessment of the third Jones 
factor, the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support." Id. 
As we explained above, we accept the 
amounts the parties submitted as reflective of 
their reasonable financial needs at the time of 
trial. We also have discussed our determination, 
based upon findings made by the trial court, that 
Ms Willey is m need of support to meet her 
financial needs, which have not been met by the 
alimony she has actually received. See Hall v 
Hall, 858 P 2d 1018, 1025 (Utah App. 1993) 
(explaining that this court may imply unstated 
findings "if it is reasonable to assume that the 
trial court actually considered the controverted 
evidence and necessarily made a fmdmg to 
resolve the controversy, but simply failed to 
record the factual determination it made"), see 
also State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 
1991) (explaining "m cases in which factual 
issues are presented to and must be resolved by 
the trial court but no fmdmgs of fact appear m 
the record," the appellate court can ' assume that 
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the tner of facts found them in accord with its 
decision"); Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 
1, 5 (Utah App. 1991) (MA finding may be 
implied if it is clear from the record, and 
therefore apparent upon review, that the finding 
was actually made as part of the tribunal's 
decision."). Also, based on the trial court's 
findings and our above analysis, we find that 
Mr. Willey is able to provide Ms. Wdley with 
the financial support she needs. See Hall, 858 
P.2d at 1018, 1025 (Utah App. 1993). 
Based upon the facts as found by the trial 
court, and upon the correction of errors 
described above, Ms. Willey is awarded alimony 
as follows: 
1. From March 7, 1995, until March 6, 2000, 
the sum of $2,240 00 as monthly alimony, 
unless sooner terminated or modified according 
to law. 
2. As additional alimony, for the purpose of 
assisting Ms. Willey m rehabilitation, and to 
prevent her from becoming a public charge, the 
sum of $500.00 per month for each month or 
portion of a month during which she is duly 
enrolled as a full-time student at the University 
of Utah or similar institution, up to a maximum 
of nme academic quarters over a period not to 
extend past March 6, 2000, plus an amount 
equal to the sum of tuition, fees, books, and 
other costs directly incurred m pursumg that 
education. 
II. Allocation of Debt 
We have before us two related issues arising 
from the allocation of the parties' marital debts. 
First, we review the numerical allocation made 
by the trial court Second, we consider Ms. 
Willey's argument that the trial court improperly 
allowed Mr. Willey to offset his alimony 
obligation agamst Ms Willey's share of the 
marital debt. 
A. Allocation of marital debt. 
After trial, the parties' marital residence was 
sold at a loss. The resulting debt was divided 
between the parties Other debts arising from 
various loans and obligations were also divided 
between the parties. However, Mr. Willey 
voluntarily paid his and Ms Willey's marital 
debts in full. As a result, the trial court allowed 
Mr Willey to withhold alimony from Ms. 
Willey to offset amounts Ms. Willey owed Mr. 
Willey for repaying her share of the marital 
debts On remand, the trial court considered Ms. 
Willey's portion of the marital debts forgiven 
because Mr. Willey had already fully paid Ms. 
Willey's debts. As an exchange, the court did 
not calculate the debt as a part of Ms. Willey's 
needs m determining alimony. 
The attorneys for both parties agreed to this 
arrangement at trial on remand, and on appeal, 
neither party challenges the trial court's action. 
We therefore accept the resolution reached and 




B. Offset of alimony. 
In a separate but consolidated appeal, Ms. 
Willey challenges the legality of allowing Mr. 
Willey to offset marital debt Ms. Willey owed 
him agamst the alimony obligation he owed Ms. 
Willey This specific question was referred by 
the trial court to the domestic commissioner for 
review. After noting the obligation Ms Willey 
owed to Mr. Willey arising from the marital 
debts, and rejecting Mr Willey's suggestion that 
it is inequitable to allow Ms. Willey to collect 
alimony while leaving available to her the ability 
to discharge the countervailing debt through 
filing for bankruptcy, the commissioner focused 
on what he considered to be more compelling 
concerns. The commissioner stated: 
[The] Commissioner also recognizes that 
the Court's award of alimony recognized 
[Ms. Wdley's] inability to meet her own 
reasonable and necessary monthly living 
expenses and [Mr. Willey's] ability to 
contribute toward [Ms. Willey's] unmet 
need. To allow [Mr. Willey] a total offset of 
his alimony obligation against [Ms. 
Willey's] obligation to [him] would frustrate 
the purpose of the Court's award of 
alimony. 
The commissioner recommended that the trial 
court require Mr. Willey to repay the total 
amount of withheld alimony to Ms. Willey, and 
to make ongomg alimony payments as required 
by the divorce decree. The trial court rejected 
this recommendation. Instead, m its order of 
April 5, 1993, the trial court expressly allowed 
Mr Wdley to "offset agamst [$18,840.86, the 
amount of Mr. Willey's judgment agamst Ms. 
Willey for the marital debt she owed to him,] 
the alimony he would otherwise be required to 
pay to [Ms. Willey]." In addition, the trial court 
apparently took the offset amount into 
consideration m reallocation of the marital debts 
m Ms. Willey's favor. 
Under the facts of this case, the trial court 
erred by allowing Mr. Willey to offset the 
alimony agamst Ms. Willey's debt to him. 
Nonetheless, we have taken mto account the 
inappropriate offset m extendmg Ms Wdley's 
alimony. Therefore, we do not disturb the trial 
court's allocation and award only because we 
have awarded Ms Willey additional alimony to 
facilitate the rehabditative award the tnal court 
found appropriate. To also require Mr Wdley 
to retroactively pay the alimony retamed under 
the inappropriate offset would be inequitable and 
unjust. Our resolution of the case does not 
require reworking the debt allocation, nor does 
it require us to revisit the tnal court's decision 
to allow Mr. Willey to offset Ms Wdley's debt 
to him agamst his alimony obligation. 
HI. Attorney Fees 
The tnal court has agam failed to make the 
necessary findings regarding attorney fees for 
the ongmal tnal and proceedings m this case. 
Furthermore, no findings have been made 
regarding the appropnate amount of attorney 
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fees to be awarded Ms. Willey for her prior 
successful appeal, as we "ordered. As we said in 
Willey I, the 
trial court may award attorney fees in 
divorce proceedings. Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-3 (Supp. 1993). "The award must be 
based on evidence of the financial need of 
the receiving spouse, the ability of the other 
spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees/ Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 
493 (Utah App. 1991). "The decision to 
make such an award and the amount thereof 
rest primarily in the sound discretion of the 
trial court." Id. However, "[t]o permit 
meaningful review of the trial court's 
discretionary ruling, '[w]e have consistently 
encouraged trial courts to make findings to 
explain the factors which they considered 
relevant in arriving at an attorney fee 
award.'" Id. at 494. . . . 
A court may consider, among other 
factors, the difficulty of the litigation, 
the efficiency of the attorneys, the 
reasonableness of the number of hours 
spent on the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality, the amount 
involved in the case and the result 
attained, and the expertise and 
experience of the attorneys involved. 
Id., 810 P.2d at 493-94. 
. . . However, the trial court did not 
independently assess . . . the reasonableness 
of [Ms.] Willey's fees. The court merely 
noted ["the entire financial condition of the 
parties cannot justify combined attorney's 
fees in excess of $65,000 with little or no 
marital property remaining"]. While this 
statement may indicate the trial court 
believed both parties ' fees were 
unreasonable, it does not constitute a finding 
addressing the reasonableness of [Ms.] 
Willey's attorney fees according to the Bell 
factors. 
Willey I, 866 P.2d at 555-56. 
While the trial court has entered findings 
regarding Ms. Willey's financial ability to pay 
attorney fees necessitated by the trial, no 
findings regarding her ability to pay fees 
incurred on appeal have been made. The trial 
court found that Mr. Willey had the ability to 
pay Ms. Willey's attorney fees. However, the 
trial court failed to make specific findings 
regarding the reasonableness of Ms. Willey's 
fees at trial and on appeal. 
In this case the trial court has twice failed to 
address and make the necessary factual 
determinations. In the interests of finality, and 
to avoid subjecting the parties to even more 
expense and difficulty in resolving what should 
have been a routine part of the case, we are 
constrained to make our own determination on 
the issue. Fairness to both parties demands such 
a resolution. 
Rather than remanding again for the trial court 
to examine these same issues, we will exercise 
our equitable power to review the evidence 
directly regarding equitable matters, and to 
make the necessary findings on the issues not 
reached by the trial court. See Owen v. Owen, 
579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978) (noting that 
appellate court can review evidence and make its 
own findings in divorce proceeding, which is in 
equity); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 709 
P.2d 360, 361 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) ("On 
appeal, we have broad equitable powers and are 
not necessarily bound or limited by the trial 
court's findings."); Haddow v. Haddow, 707 
P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985) ("[I]n reviewing a 
trial court's actions in a divorce case, we are 
vested with broad equitable powers."). To do 
otherwise would subject both parties to the 
unwarranted necessity of once again presenting 
these questions to the trial court. 
We accept the trial court's finding that Ms. 
Willey was unable to pay attorney fees incurred 
in the course of the trial. We find no evidence 
to suggest her ability has improved. We 
therefore find her still in need of financial 
assistance to pay those fees. 
We also accept and find no evidence requiring 
us to revisit or revise the trial court's finding 
that Mr. Willey is financially able to assist Ms. 
Willey with payment of the attorney fees she 
incurred. 
The trial court has twice expressed concern 
that the total attorney fees incurred by the 
parties in the course of this litigation is 
excessive considering the absence of any 
financial net worth after deduction of the marital 
debts from the marital assets. We share that 
concern. However, that is not the determining 
issue. See Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493-94 
(Utah App. 1991). The trial court should have 
addressed the question of whether, under all the 
relevant circumstances, Ms. Willey's attorney 
fees are reasonable. The factors identified in 
Bell also permit an examination of the difficulty 
of the litigation, the attorneys' efficiency, the 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on 
the case, the fee customarily charged in the 
locality, the amount involved in the case and the 
result obtained, and the expertise and experience 
of the attorneys involved. Willey I, 866 P.2d at 
555. 
The trial court found that this litigation should 
not have been difficult, that the efficiency of 
both attorneys was not good, that the number of 
total hours for which the attorneys have billed is 
excessive under the circumstances of this case, 
that Ms. Willey's attorney presented evidence of 
$19,215.00 in fees as of the time of trial, and a 
total of $36,015.00 as of the time of the hearing 
on remand, for which Ms. Willey sought 
reimbursement of $15,150.00 for fees and 
$1,539.38 in costs at the time of the hearing on 
remand. The trial court also found Ms. Willey's 
attorney's hourly rate of $150 to be reasonable, 
given his experience and expertise. We do not 
disturb these findings. 
The critical determination to be made here is 
not the overall efficiency of attorneys for both 
parties, but whether or not the fees sought by 
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Ms. Willey are reasonable under the 
circumstances of this case. At the time of the 
hearing on remand, Ms. Willey sought 
reimbursement of $20,150 from a total of 
$36,015 she is obligated to pay. Of this amount, 
Mr. Willey had already been ordered to pay 
$5,000.00. Without adequate explanation or 
findings, on remand the trial court ordered Mr. 
Willey to pay an additional $10,000 as the 
correct adjustment. 
Under the unique circumstances of this case 
we award Ms. Willey a total of $36,015.00 in 
attorney fees, plus $1,539.38 in costs, for fees 
and costs incurred at trial, on appeal, on 
remand, and on this appeal. All other fees and 
costs incurred herein by either party, including 
those incurred in the course of this second 
appeal, shall be the sole obligation of the party 
incurring those expenses. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse and remand to the trial court for 
entry of an amended decree as is necessary to 
correct the alimony award to include the sum of 
$2,240.00 per month effective March 7, 1995, 
and continuing until five years from that date. 
This award shall be subject to termination or 
modification according to law. The order shall 
include the rehabilitative award previously 
described in this opinion, with the provision that 
it shall be available from March 7, 1995, and 
continuing until five years from that date. 
Finally, the order shall include a total of 
$37,554.38 awarded to Ms. Willey for attorney 
fees and costs incurred in the entire course of 
these proceedings. Any amount Mr. Willey 
actually paid to Ms. Willey for attorney fees 
under any prior trial court order shall be 
credited against this award of fees and costs. 
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order 
consistent with this opinion. 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Associate Presiding Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Carolyn Endrody (Ms. Endrody) appeals the 
trial court's awards of marital property, 
alimony, and attorney fees. The Endrody Trust 
(the Trust) responds only to Ms. Endrody's 
challenge regarding the determination of marital 
property. Laszlo Endrody Jr. (Mr. Endrody) 
responds to all of the issues raised by Ms. 
Endrody.1 We affirm in part and remand in part. 
BACKGROUND 
Mr. Endrody, a former sea captain, was 
employed as a Panama Canal pilot beginning in 
early 1975. Ms. Endrody met Mr. Endrody 
while she was serving in the U.S. military in 
Panama, and the parties married on April 11, 
1975. The parties lived in Panama until 1979, 
during which time two children were born. 
In 1979, the parties established residence in 
Iron County, Utah where they lived on a 
working ranch (the Endrody Ranch) owned by 
Mr. Endrody and his parents. Ms. Endrody 
lived at the Endrody Ranch with the parties' two 
children, and Mr. Endrody spent his leave time 
there, while continuing his employment with the 
Panama Canal. The Endrody Ranch had been 
purchased by Mr. Endrody's parents in 1970 for 
$80,000. The parents made a $25,000 down 
payment on the property, and paid annual 
payments on the remaining balance. Prior to the 
marriage of the parties, Mr. Endrody entered 
into a rental agreement with his parents, under 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLENP.WILLEY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLE Y, ) 
Civil No. 91 490 0101 
Defendant. ) Judge David S. Young 
) 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on November 21 and 22, 1991. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock, and defendant 
was present and represented by her counsel, Roger Sandack. The court having heard 
testimony, received exhibits, heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully 
advised, now makes and enters the following: 
Findings of Fact 
1. Residence. Plaintiff and defendant were bona fide residents of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of this action. 
2. Marriage. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife having been 
married on April 29,1982, in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
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3. Children. No children have been born as issue of this marriage, and none 
are expected. 
4. Grounds for Divorce. During the marriage, irreconcilable differences have 
developed between the parties making continuation of their marriage impossible. 
Each party is entitled to a decree of divorce from the other party. 
5. Real Property. During the marriage, the parties acquired a house and real 
property located at 2605 East Maywood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. The house 
should be sold as soon as feasible because it constitutes a substantial financial burden 
for the parties. The house should be listed at a price of $350,000 with a new real 
estate agent to be agreed upon by the parties as soon as the present listing agreement 
expires. Upon sale of the house, the first mortgage in the approximate amount of 
$232,000 to Zions Bank should be paid in full, and the second mortgage in the 
approximate amount of $80,000 to Beverly Johnson should be paid in full, together 
with all costs of sale. Any net proceeds of the sale then remaining should be divided 
as follows: 
(a) If the house is sold within 90 days of the date of November 22, 1991, 
all remaining net proceeds of sale should be awarded to defendant. 
(b) If the house is sold after the expiration of 90 days from November 22, 
1991, the parties should divide any net proceeds equally. 
(c) In the event that the sales price of the house is not sufficient to pay 
the first and second mortgages and costs of sale, the parties shall be equally 
responsible for payment of any short fall or deficiency. 
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Plaintiff should continue to make the first mortgage payment until the house is 
sold. Payment of the second mortgage shall continue to be deferred. Defendant may 
remain in possession of the house until it is sold. 
6. Automobiles. The court finds, based on the parties' stipulation, that the 
1988 Landcruiser has a net value, after payment of the encumbrance thereon, of 
$7,000. The Landcruiser shall be awarded to defendant. The court finds that the 
1987 Mercedes has no equity, since it is subject to a lease agreement. Plaintiff should 
assume and pay the lease payments, and hold defendant harmless therefrom. 
7. Individual Retirement Account. The individual retirement account in the 
name of Rosalind Willey should be divided as follows: 
(a) The stock in American Telephone and Telegraph should be awarded 
to defendant since it was a family gift to her. 
(b) The cash amounts in the individual retirement account should be 
divided equally between the parties. 
8. 401K Plan. The 401K plan has a net value of approximately $24,000, 
which should be divided equally between the parties. Plaintiff should repay the loan 
to the 401K plan and should be entitled to the benefit of any increase in the value of 
the 40 IK plan accrued as a result of the payment of the loan. 
9. Furniture and Personal Property. The furniture in the parties' home 
should be awarded to defendant. The furniture acquired by plaintiff after the parties' 
separation should be awarded to him, and he should assume and pay any obligations 
incurred in connection therewith. In addition, plaintiff should be awarded the 
following personal items currently located in the parties' home: 
(a) Oak chair in den; 
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(b) Oak table and chairs (presently being stored); 
(c) Plaintiffs books; 
(d) Framed maps in the den; 
(e) Framed birds in the master bedroom; 
(f) Brass bird bookends; 
(g) Carved arctic loon; and 
(h) Butter churn. 
Each party should be awarded the other personal property presently in his or her 
possession. 
10. J. G. Willey Limited Partnership. Based on the stipulation of the parties, 
the court finds that this is a premarital asset of no value and awards it to plaintiff. 
11. Pension Plan. Plaintiff currently has a pension plan with his employer, 
Kidder, Peabody & Company. The pension plan should be divided between the 
parties pursuant to the Woodward formula as of November 21, 1991, pursuant to a 
qualified domestic relations order. 
12. Alimony. The court finds that a reasonable average income to use for 
plaintiff in determining alimony to be paid in this matter is $110,000. Because of 
plaintiffs employment as a stock broker, his income has fluctuated. In 1987 and 
1991, plaintiff had unusually good income years. The court further finds that 
defendant is capable of earning an income of between $1,500 and $2,000 per month, 
based on her education and qualifications. Accordingly, the court finds that it is 
equitable that plaintiff pay alimony to defendant of $1,500 per month for one year 
from the date of trial herein, and $1,000 per month for three years thereafter. The 
court further finds that plaintiff has been supporting defendant during the parties' 
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separation of approximately one year, and it is appropriate to take that time period 
into account in determining the term of alimony. Alimony shall terminate at the end 
of four years from the date of trial, or when defendant remarries, cohabits with a 
member of the opposite sex, or dies, whichever first occurs. 
13. Decree of Divorce. The decree of divorce herein should be final upon 
January 1,1992. 
14. Deferred Compensation and Bonuses. The court finds that based on work 
already performed by plaintiff as an employee of Kidder, Peabody & Company, he is 
entitled to a bonus in January of 1992. The amount of that bonus should be divided 
equally between the parties. The court further finds that future bonuses, which 
plaintiff is entitled to be paid in 1995 and 1996, have been earned as of this time and 
are contingent only upon plaintiffs continued employment with Kidder, Peabody & 
Company. Accordingly, if plaintiff is still employed by Kidder, Peabody & Company 
and receives those bonuses, the amount of those bonuses should be divided equally 
between the parties. The court further finds that plaintiffs deferred compensation 
for 1991 will be used to pay ongoing expenses and should not otherwise be divided be 
the parties. Each party shall be responsible for the payment of taxes on the portion of 
the bonuses distributed to that party. 
15. Claim of Premarital Contribution. Defendant asserted a claim in this 
matter that she made a premarital contribution to the marriage of approximately 
$29,000, consisting of the equity in the home owned by her located on Logan Avenue 
prior to the marriage. The court finds that the funds received upon the sale of the 
Logan Avenue house in 1983 were commingled with other funds of the parties by 
their choice and have lost their separate character as premarital property. 
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Accordingly, the court makes no award as a result of the claimed premarital 
contribution. 
16. Joint Tax Return. The parties shall file a joint income tax return for 1991 
and divide any refunds to be received equally. In the event that taxes are due, the 
parties shall each pay one-half of any taxes. 
17. Medical Expenses of Defendant. Defendant underwent surgery in 
September of 1991. The medical expenses incurred in connection with that surgery 
have been submitted for payment to plaintiffs health insurance provider. Any of 
those expenses not paid by insurance should be paid from plaintiffs Complus Plan 
insofar as there are sufficient funds in the plan to do so. In the event that the 
Complus Plan does not cover all of those medical expenses, plaintiff should be 
responsible for payment. 
18. First Interstate Advance Line. During the marriage, plaintiff and 
defendant had a credit line with First Interstate Bank. The court finds that the credit 
line was incurred to cover family expenses. Each party should pay one-half of the 
amount due on the credit line as of November 21,1991. 
19. Other Debts and Obligations. Any debts and obligations incurred by the 
parties since their separation should be paid by the party who incurred them. The 
court finds that defendant is not entitled to be reimbursed for tuition incurred by her 
for Spring Quarter of 1991. 
20. Obligation of Blake Johnson. Blake Johnson owes the parties 
approximately $2,000 which he pays to them at the rate of approximately $100 per 
month. Defendant should be entitled to receive the payments from Blake Johnson. 
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21. State Tax Refund for 1990. The state income tax refund for 1990 should be 
divided equally between the parties. 
22. Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Plaintiff has previously paid $1,950 toward 
defendant's attorney's fees and should be required to pay an additional $3,500 toward 
defendant's attorney's fees. Otherwise, each party should pay his or her own costs 
and fees incurred herein. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes an enters the 
following: 
Conclusions of Law 
1. Each party should be awarded a decree of divorce from the other party, to 
become final upon January 1,1992. 
2. The real and personal property of the parties should be awarded as set 
forth in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10,11, and 20 of the findings of fact herein. 
3. The court should enter a qualified domestic relations order with respect to 
the division of the pension plan as set forth in paragraph 11 of the findings of fact 
herein. 
4. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay alimony to defendant as set forth in 
paragraph 12 of the findings of fact herein. 
5. Future bonuses to plaintiff through Kidder, Peabody & Company in 1992, 
1995, and 1996, should be divided between the parties as set forth in paragraph 14 of 
the findings of fact herein. Plaintiffs deferred compensation for 1991 should be used 
to pay the ongoing expenses and should not otherwise be divided by the parties. Each 
party should be ordered to pay the taxes due on the portion of the bonuses distributed 
to that party. 
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6. Defendant is not entitled to an award of a premarital contribution in the 
amount of $29,000, as set forth in paragraph 15 of the findings of fact herein. 
7. The parties should file a joint income tax return for 1991 and should be 
ordered to divide any refunds to be received equally. The parties should each be 
ordered to pay one-half of any taxes. 
8. Any of defendant's surgery expenses not paid by insurance should be paid 
from plaintiffs Complus Plan, insofar as there are sufficient funds in the plan to do 
so. In the event that the Complus Plan does not cover all of those medical expenses, 
plaintiff should be responsible for payment. 
9. The parties should be ordered to pay the debts and obligations incurred 
during the marriage as set forth in paragraphs 18,19, and 20. 
10. The state income tax refund for 1990 should be awarded equally between 
the parties, 
11. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay an additional $3,500 toward defendant's 
attorney's fees. Otherwise, each party should be ordered to pay his or her own costs 
and fees incurred herein. 
DATED this / V*^clav^fJanuary, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be delivered to the 
following, this 30th day of December, 1991: 
Roger D. Sandack, Esq. 
500 Reams Building 
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ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WHLEY, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
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Civil No. 91 490 0101 
Judge David S. Young 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on November 21 and 22, 1991. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock, and defendant 
was present and represented by her counsel, Roger Sandack. The court having heard 
testimony, received exhibits, heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully 
advised, and having made and entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED: 
1. Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff Glen P. Willey is hereby awarded a decree 
of divorce from defendant Rosalind Ann Johnson Willey, and defendant Rosalind Ann 
Johnson Willey is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from plaintiff Glen P. Willey, 
on grounds of irreconcilable differences, such decree to become final on January 1, 
1992. 
2. Real P rope r ty . The house and real property located at 2605 East 
Maywood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah is ordered to be sold as soon as feasible. The 
house shall be listed at a price of $350,000 with a new real estate agent to be agreed 
upon by the parties, as soon as the present listing agreement expires. Upon sale of 
the house, the first mortgage in the approximate amount of $232,000 to Zions Bank is 
ordered to be paid in full, and the second mortgage in the approximate amount of 
$80,000 to Beverly Johnson is ordered to be paid in full, together with all costs of sale. 
Any net proceeds of the sale then remaining are ordered to be divided as follows: 
(a) If the house is sold within 90 days of the date of November 22, 1991, 
all remaining net proceeds of sale are awarded to defendant. 
(b) If the house is sold after the expiration of 90 days from November 22, 
1991, the parties are ordered to divide any net proceeds equally. 
(c) In the event that the sales price of the house is not sufficient to pay 
the first and second mortgages and costs of sale, the parties are ordered to be 
equally responsible for payment of any short fall or deficiency. 
Plaintiff is ordered to continue to make the first mortgage payment until the 
house is sold. Payment of the second mortgage shall continue to be deferred. 
Defendant may remain in possession of the house until it is sold. 
3. Automobiles. The Landcruiser is awarded to defendant. Plaintiff is 
ordered to assume and pay the lease payments on the 1987 Mercedes, and hold 
defendant harmless therefrom. 
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4. Individual Retirement Account The individual retirement account in 
the name of Rosalind Willey is ordered to be divided as follows: 
(a) The stock in American Telephone and Telegraph is awarded to 
defendant since it was a family gift to her. 
(b) The cash amounts in the individual retirement account are ordered 
to be divided equally between the parties. 
5. 401K Plan. The 401K plan having a net value of approximately $24,000 
is ordered to be divided equally between the parties. Plaintiff is ordered to repay the 
loan to the 401K plan and is awarded the benefit of any increase in the value of the 
40 IK plan accrued as a result of the payment of the loan. 
6. Furni ture and Personal Property. The furniture in the parties' home 
is awarded to defendant. The furniture acquired by plaintiff since the parties' 
separation is awarded to him, and he is ordered to assume and pay any obligations 
incurred in connection therewith. In addition, plaintiff is awarded the following 
personal items currently located in the parties' home: 
(a) Oak chair in den; 
(b) Oak table and chairs (presently being stored); 
(c) Plaintiffs books; 
(d) Framed maps in the den; 
(e) Framed birds in the master bedroom; 
(f) Brass bird bookends; 
(g) Carved arctic loon; and 
(h) Butter churn. 
Each party is awarded the other personal property presently in his or her possession. 
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7. J . G. Willey Limited Partnership. The J. G. Willey Limited Partnership 
is awarded to plaintiff. 
8. Pension Plan. The pension plan with Kidder, Peabody & Company is 
ordered to be divided between the parties pursuant to the Woodward formula as of 
November 21, 1991, pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order. 
9. Alimony. Plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to defendant in the amount 
of $1,500 per month for one year from the date of trial herein, and $1,000 per month 
for three years thereafter. Alimony shall terminate at the end of four years from the 
date of trial, or when defendant remarries, cohabits with a member of the opposite 
sex, or dies, whichever first occurs. 
10. Deferred Compensat ion and Bonuses. The amount of the bonus 
plaintiff is entitled to in January of 1992 as a result of his employment with Kidder, 
Peabody & Company is ordered to be divided equally between the parties. Any future 
bonuses which plaintiff is entitled to be paid in 1995 and 1996, and which have been 
earned as of this time and are contingent only upon plaintiffs continued employment 
with Kidder, Peabody & Company, are ordered to be divided equally between the 
parties. Plaintiffs deferred compensation for 1991 is ordered to be used to pay 
ongoing expenses and shall not otherwise be divided be the parties. Each party is 
ordered to pay the taxes on the portion of the bonuses distributed to that party. 
11. Joint Tax Return. The parties are ordered to file a joint income tax 
return for 1991 and divide any refunds to be received equally. In the event that taxes 
are due, the parties are ordered to each pay one-half of any taxes. 
12. Medical Expenses of Defendant. Any medical expenses incurred by 
defendant in connection with her surgery in September of 1991 which have not been 
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paid by plaintiffs health insurance provider shall be paid from plaintiffs Complus 
Plan, insofar as there are sufficient funds in the plan to do so. In the event that the 
Complus Plan does not cover all of those medical expenses, plaintiff is ordered to be 
responsible for payment. 
13. First Interstate Advance Line. Each party is ordered to pay one-half of 
the amount due on the credit line with First Interstate Bank as of November 21, 
1991. 
14. Other Debts and Obligations. Any debts and obligations incurred by 
the parties since their separation are ordered to be paid by the party who incurred 
them. 
15. Obligation of Blake Johnson. Defendant is awarded the obligation 
from Blake Johnson of $2,0U0, which he pays at the rate of approximately $100 per 
month. 
16. State Tax Refund for 1990. The state income tax refund for 1990 is 
ordered to be divided equally between the parties. 
17. Attorneys ' Fees and Costs. Plaintiff is ordered to pay an additional 
$3,500 toward defendant's attorney's fees. Otherwise, each party is ordered to pay his 
or her own costs and fees incurred herein. 
DATED this j ^ d a y of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
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BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
Glen P. WILLEY, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Rosalind Ann Johnson WILLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 920091-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 29, 1993. 
In divorce action, the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, David S. Young, J., 
divided marital proper.'/, granted alimony 
and awarded wire attorney (ees. Wife ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals. Biiiir.gs. ? J, 
held that trial court (zil»d to make sufficient 
findings to support aware of alimony, alloca-
tion of debt and award of attorney fees. 
Affirmed in part, and reversed and re-
manded in part. 
1. Divorce 02S6(3.i) 
Court of Appeals wil not overturn trial 
court's alimony ruling as long as court sup-
ports its ruling with adequate fir.dr.gs and 
exercises its discretion according to govern-
ing standard. 
2. Divorce c=>239 
In fixing reasonable alimony award, trial 
court must make sufficiently detailed find-
ings on each of the governing factors to 
enable reviewing court to insure that trial 
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court s discretionary determination was ra-
tionally based upon those factors. 
3. Divorce 0 2 3 9 
In setting alimony award, rial court 
failed to make required r.ndings regarding 
parties' financial need. 
4. Divorce C=»237 
In determining husband's alimony obli-
gation, trial court failed to adjust ei:her par-
ty's financial needs to account for debt pay-
ments each would owe on bank line or credit 
after court's property distribution, or proba-
ble result of sale of marital home in assessing 
the parties' respective needs. 
5. Divorce C=»252.4 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
dividing debt for second mortgage between 
the parties, despite wife's contention that 
husband should have been individually re-
sponsible for mortgage because portion of 
money borrowed from her parents, secured 
by crust d^d against the house, was used for 
purchase of couple's automobile. 
6. Divorce e=>237 
Since husband had duty of supporting 
stepchildren only during prior marriage, ex-
penses of his former stepchildren were not to 
be considered in determining his financial 
need and award of alimony to wife from 
subsequent marriage. U.C.A.1953. TS—45—i. 
7. Divorce 0 2 3 7 
In calculating husband's alimony obli-
gation, expenses of mother's children from 
former marriage were not to be considered. 
where children's father was paying support 
required under the guidelines. 
S. Divorce e=>239 
In determining husband's alimony obli-
gation, trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in setting wire's earnings at SS60 per month 
based on projection of full-time work at her 
current salary, but there was no basis for 
trial court's finding that wife could earn 
.51.500 to .$2,000 per month within a year or 
two. 
9. Divorce 0 2 4 7 
To extent that alimony award is intend-
ed to be rehabilitative, its goal is to close the 
gap between actual expenses ar.c 
come to enable receiving spouse 
better able to support himself 
when alimony and schooling end 
10. Divorce <5=>247 
In fashioning award of rehab 
mony, court must make realistic a 
of actual current income and actu: 
and must consider time deman; 
penses of attending school. 
11. Divorce c=252.5(l) 
Wife had no equity in mariU 
rived from proceeds of sale of her 
home, where any premarital equi 
sumed during the marriage. 
12. Divorce C=>224 
Award of attorney fees in c 
must be based on evidence of fin 
of receiving spouse, ability of othe 
pay, and reasonableness of requ 
ii.C.A.1953. 3CW-3. 
13. Divorce C=>223t 227(1) 
Decision to award attorney 
vorce case and amount thereof re 
iy in sound discretion of trial COL 
1953. 30-3-3. 
14. Divorce e=>226 
Trial court, in awarding wife 
ly 25?tf of her requested attorney 
to address reasonableness of su 
cording to governing factors, ar 
findings regarding either wife's a 
her own attorney fees or husbanc 
oav her fees. (J.C.A.1953, 30-3-
Roger D. Sandack. Salt Lake C 
for defendant and appellant. 
Ellen Maycock. Salt Lake City. 
plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BILLINGS. P.J.. and 3 
ORME, JJ. 
BILLINGS. Presiding Judge: 
Rosalind Willey appeals the 
decisions in this divorce action 
division of marital property, and 
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attorney fees. Because of insufficient nnd-
ir.P' NV- I-V*rs^ 1 7 ^ :*svi:\d t:.e co\^ r.'s rd-
ir.gs o n a^:r-ori? anc* &e awa-r^ of a;:orr.ey 
f*es. ^ 2 ^ i 0 r 2 V — 2 ar-d remand che prop-
ertv division co give the court che opportuni-
ty to reconsider these related financial as-
0ects of the divorce. We otherwise aifirrn. 
FACTS 
Appellant Rosalind Ann Johnson Wiiley 
and appellee Glen Paul Wiiley were married 
on April 29, 19S2. The parties had no chil-
dren together, and both had been married 
oreviously. Mrs. Wiiley had custody of three 
children from her former marriage who, at 
the time of the Willeys' divorce, were twenty, 
seventeen, and thirteen years old. 
During the marriage, Mr. Wiiley worked 
as a stockbroker, receiving commissions in-
stead of regular wages. Since 19S5, Mr. 
Wtlley's annual income ranged from a high of 
$133,052 in 19S7, to a low of 573,095 in 19S9. 
In addition, Mr. Wiiley earned deferred bo-
nuses in 19S7 (approximately S14.2CO), 1990 
(approximately $11,000) and 1991 (projected 
at' $16,219), payable in 1992. 1995 and 1996, 
respectively, as long is he remained em-
ployed by the same firm. 
At the time of their marriage, Mrs. Wiiley 
was employed full-time in retail clothing 
sales and earned approximately $I0,CCO an-
nually. Alter the marriage, Mrs. Wiiley 
worked sporadically part-time. r.*r income 
ranged from a high of S6ST1 in 19S5 to 
nothing in 19S9. In 1990, she earned gross 
wages of $4-112. working for five dollars an 
hour as a part-time salesperson in a book-
store and occasionally leading literary discus-
sion groups formed through the bookstore. 
Mrs. Wiiley also received S332 per month in 
child suaaort frora her ftrct hvishaad. 
To finance their lifestyle, the parties liqui-
dated assets and incurred debts. Ntrs. Wil-
ley owned a home a: the time of her mar-
riage to Mr. Wiiley. The parties sold this 
home in 19S3, using the $29,164 in equity to 
purchase and improve a new home in their 
joint names. In 1935, the paries sold their 
joint home and purchased the home in which 
they lived at the time of their divorce. At 
the time of trial, they owed S232.CC0 to Zions 
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Bank on the -Irs; mortgage on :he marital 
horae. l?> idc&Q?., Cr.e, oarie$ hid to?.s<3:.> 
dated loans from Mrs. Wilie/s parents i.r.o 
an approxima:eiy $50,000 second mortgage 
on the home. 
The parties separated in November o: 
1990. In February of 1991, they reached a 
stipulation regarding temporary support. 
Under the agreement, Mr. Wiiley mace most 
of the payments on the marital debts, induc-
ing the $2492 monthly payment to Zions 
Bank on the first mortgage for their home 
and an approximately $360 monthly payment 
against a Firs: Interstate Bank line of credit 
(the First Interstate debt). He also paid 
$1500 in monthly support to Mrs. Wiiley. 
The monthly payments for the second mort-
gage were deferred temporarily by agree-
ment. Mrs. Wiiley remained in possession of 
the marital home. 
After a two-day trial, the trial court en-
tered findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and a final decree of divorce. We review the 
court's decision only as it affects the issues 
on appeal. 
The court ordered each party to assume 
one-half of the approximately $!2.CCO Firs: 
Interstate debt. The court denied >Lrs. Wii-
ley's claim that she should receive $29.15-4 
from the sale of her premarital home as 
premarital property, nnding tha: :'r.»$» pro-
ceeds had lost their separate identity. The 
court awarded Mrs. Wiiley $.5000 of her doc-
umented $19,215 in attorney (as. Further-
more, the court set alimony for Mrs. Wiiley 
at $1500 a month for one year to be reduced 
to $1000 a month for the next three years 
and then to terminate. Relevant to that 
award, the court found that Mrs. Wiiley 
could earn $1500 to $2000 monthly and that 
Mr. Wiiley earned an average of SilO.C-CO 
annually, or approximately $90£0 a month. 
In addition, the court ordered the marital 
home to be listed at $350,000 and sold as 
soon as possible. Tne court ordered the sale 
proceeds to be used to retire both mortgages 
on the home and cover the costs of sale. 
Any remaining proceeds were to go to Mrs. 
Wiiley if the home sold within ninety days 
after trial. If the home sold after ninety 
days, the courw ordered the panies to &.id> 
equally any loss or gain. At oral argument, 
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the parties agreed :he home sold for a loss, 
resulting lr. a debt c: approximately $37,000. 
On appeal, Mrs. Willey argues che cour. 
abused its discretion in: (i) se::ing che ali-
mony award; (2) ordering her to be responsi-
ble for one-half of che marital debts; (3) 
failing co recognize her premarital equity in 
the marital home; and (4) failing to award 
her a. significant contribution coward her 
claimed attorney (as of $19,215. In addi-
tion, Mrs. Willey requests attorney izes on 
appeal. 
I. ALIMONT AND PROPERTY 
DIVISION 
Mrs. Willey contends the trial court 
abused its discretion in setting the alimony 
award. She claims the court failed to make 
sufficient findings regarding either parvus 
financial need, ignored both her actual needs 
and her ability to support herself, and erro-
neously imputed 31500 to S2C-CO a month to 
her as income. Because the trial court failed 
to make sufficient findings regarding the 
parties' needs and resources, we reverse and 
remand for a redetermination of the amount 
of the alimony award and the entry of find-
ings necessary to support the revised award. 
A. Legal Standard 
[I] We will not overturn a trial court's 
alimony ruling as long as the court supports 
its ruling with adequate findings and exercis-
es its discretion according to the standards 
we have set. Bell v. Bell, SIO ?.2d 439, 491 
(Utah App.l99i). In Belt, this court reiterat-
ed the well-settled standard for alimony set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Jones v. 
/ o w j / l C O P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 19S5), 
which stated: 
"(T)he most important function of alimony 
is to provide support for the (spouse) as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living 
she (or he) enjoyed during the marriage, 
and to prevent the (spouse) from becoming 
a public charge." English v. English, 565 
P.2d (409) at 411 ((Utah 1977)). . . . 
(T)hree factors . . . must be considered in 
fixing a reasonable alimony award: 
(1) the financial conditions and mzds 
of che (spouse seeking support); 
(2) che ability of the (sp 
support] to produce a su:. 
for (himself or] herself; z 
(3) the ability of the (pa\ 
provide support. 
Jones, 7CO ?.2d at 1075. 
(2] "Failure to consider the 
in fashioning an alimony awar 
an abuse of discretion." Bell, S 
(citations omitted). Thus, "th 
must make sufficiently detaile 
each factor to enable a revie* 
ensure that the tr.ai court's 
determination was rationally ba 
three Jones factors. Id. (citat 
"If sufficient findings are not rr 
reverse unless the record is cie 
troverted such as co allow us 
Jones factors as a matter of la 
Id. (citation omitted). 
B. Trial Court Fine 
In its findings of fact and 
law on alimony, the trial cour 
The court finds that a re: 
age income to use for plainti. 
ing alimony to be paid in 
SI 10,003. Because of plair 
ment as a stock broker, h 
fluctuated. In 19S7 and 199 
unusually good income year 
further finds that defendant 
earning an income of betwe 
$2,000 per month, based on 
and qualifications. Accordir 
finds that it is equitable tha 
alimony to defendant of Sl,^  
for one year from the date 
and $1,000 per month for 
thereafter. Tne court furt 
plaintiff has been support 
during the parties' separati 
mately one year, and it is 
take that time period into ac 
mining the term of alimony, 
terminate at the end of four 
date of trial, or when defenc 
cohabits with a member o 
sex, or dies, whichever firs 
(3) In setting the aiimor 
court made no findings on M 
WILLEY v. 
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ncial need as the rlrst Jomes faccor re-
iViile^3 r" inandai n S 5 d ' w W c h underl>™S r*ac" 
il'deterrninacion is required for an assess-
l of the third Jones factor, the ability of 
'a oavor spouse to provide support.1 
We have previously reversed an alimony 
ivard in a similar case when the trial court 
'ailed to address the parties' financial needs. 
[n 8M * 5 /^4 810 P.2d 4S9 (Utah App.1991), 
because the parties "dissipated and lived on 
dit," the trial court did not give "much 
u-ateht . . . as to what the needs and abilities 
of"the parties might be." Id. at 49*2. Thus, 
ch* trial court failed to determine the reason-
ableness of the expenses each party claimed. 
This court reasoned that "(w)ithout a finding 
on reasonable expenses, we are unable to 
determine the true needs of Wife, or to de-
termine Husband's actual ability to pay and, 
therefore, to balance Wife's needs against 
Husband's ability to pay as required in 
Jones." Id. at 493. 
We face the identical problem here. At 
trial, both parties testified about their finan-
cial needs. Mr. Willey claimed monthly ex-
cesses totalling $3623, including $350 for re-
'payment of the First Interstate debt, but 
excluding mortgage payments and expenses 
for the marital home. Mrs. Willey countered 
that his expenses were approximately 52400 
because they should exclude attorney fees, 
credit card repayments, and the $360 First 
Interstate debt repayment. On the first day 
of trial, Mrs. Willey claimed expenses of 
$5905, including payment of the first mort-
gage on the marital home. Alternatively, she 
claimed expenses of $o40o, which excluded 
the mortgage payment but included rent. 
On the second day of trial, Mrs. Willey pre-
sented revised expense figures of $4754 for 
herself and her children, or alternatively, 
$2573 for herself alone. The court made no 
findings on which, U any, of the expenses 
claimed by the parties were appropriate. 
1. The trial court should consider a payor 
spouse's reasonable needs when determining that 
spouse's ability to provide support to a former 
spouse: in short, the payor spouse's reasonable 
needs are a necessary subsidiary step in deter* 
mining the ability to provide support. S<r* 3c'<er 
v. Bakdr. 366 P.*2d 540, 5-*7 (Utah A?p.(993). 
2. Arguing Mr. Willey incurred most of the First 
Interstate debt after separation. Mrs. Willey chal-
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Thus, as in 3zlL we remand for findings on 
each party's reasonable needs so we can 
deurrnine L* che court abused its discretion 
in setting che amount and duration of the 
alimony award. See id at 493. 
Because several issues raised on appeal 
are relevant to the Jones alimony analysis, 
we reach chem to aid the trial court on 
remand. 
C. Division of Debt as it Affects 
Alimony Award 
(4] The trial court made no findings that 
would enable us to conclude it considered 
either the impact of its division of the Firs: 
Interstate debt or the probable result of the 
sale of the marital home in assessing the 
parties' respective needs. 
Regarding the First Interstate debt, Mrs. 
Willey argues that distribution of one-half of 
the debt to her was inequitable, given her 
resources and the disparity in the parties' 
income. She argues this Is especially true in 
light of the court's alimony award. She cor-
rectly notes that Mr. Willey conceded that 
she would be incapable of assuming a portion 
of this debt, and that he agreed to pay the 
full amount We vacate the court's alloca-
tion of the First Interstate debt to allow the 
court to reconsider its assignment when es-
tablishing the appropriate amount of alimo-
ny. If the trial court determines that Mrs. 
Willey is still obligated to pay a portion of 
the debt, the court should factor in her share 
of the debt payment when calculating the 
alimony award. The court may, of course. 
reallocate the debt if it deems that appropri-
ate. 
In order to effectuate repayment of the 
two mortgages, the trial court ordered: 
The house should be sold as soon as feasi-
ble because it constitutes a substantial fi-
nancial burden on the parties. The house 
lenges the trial court's finding that it was in-
curred for family expenses. However. Mrs. Wii. 
ley haj fai!:d to marshal the evidence in supper, 
of the trial court's finding and then show *hy 
this evidsr.Cf is insufficient to support that find-
ing. Set C:ah R.Civ.?. 52(a). Thus, we accept 
the court's finding. 
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should be listed at $350,000 with a new real 
estate agent to be agreed upon by che 
parties as soon as che present listing 
agreement expires. Upon sale of the 
house, the first mortgage in :he approxi-
mate amount of 3232.000 to Zion's Bank 
should be paid in full, and :he second 
mortgage in the approxima:e amount of 
$30,000 to Beverly Johnson should be paid 
in full, together with all costs of sale. Any 
net proceeds of the sale then remaining 
should be divided as follows: 
(a) If the house is sold within 90 days of 
the dace of November 22. 1991, ail re-
maining net proceeds of sale should be 
awarded to defendant. 
(b) If the house is sold after the expira-
tion of 90 days from November 22. 1991, 
the parties should divide any net pro-
ceeds equally. 
(c) In the event that the sales price of 
the house is not sufficient co pay the 
first and second mortgages and costs of 
sale, the parties shall be equally respon-
sible for payment of any short fail or 
deficiency. 
(5) Although it set a listing price, the 
court did not include any specific finding 
regarding che value of the home.1 At oral 
argument on appeal, counsel for both parties 
agreed that the sale incurred a debt of ap-
proximaceiy $37,000. Again, we conclude the 
trial court should consider this debt when it 
reexamines the alimony award on remand, 
because this debt has a direct bearing on all 
three of the Jones criteria. Set B\irt v. Burt, 
799 P.2d 1155, 1172 (Utah App.1990).1 
D. Mrs. Valley's Financial Obligation 
to K*r Children by a Previous 
Marriage 
Mrs. Willey also contends the court misap-
prehended her financial situation because it 
3. The trial court could have taken evidence on 
ind mace a specific finding regarding the value 
o: the home. If that valuation was proven incor-
rect after the sale, either party could have peti« 
tioned the court cor a codification based on a 
change o: circumstance*. Following this proce* 
d\itc would allow the court to maxe an informed 
decision based on the best data available. 
«*. As a side argument regarding the debt on the 
marital home. Mrs. Wiltey argues that a portion 
oc the money borrowed from r.t: parents. se« 
rerusec co consreer evicer.ee cc 
obligation co her children in c: 
alimony award. The extent to •. 
viduai's n^zds and ability co su 
or herself are affected by chat * 
obligation to support children 
marriage is an issue Utah's ap: 
have not directly considered. 
We note, however, the Utah U 
imposed a duty of support or 
only during the duration of c 
Utah law expressly provides th 
ent's obligation to support a su 
nates upon divorce. 
A stepparent shall support 
the same extent that a natur: 
parent is required to support 
vided, however, that upon th 
of the marriage or common 
ship between the steppar-
child's natural or adoptive pa 
port obligation shall termina 
Utah Code Ann. § 7S-45-U ( 
(6) Mr. Wille/s former step 
penses should not be considered 
Mrs. Willey alimony. The c 
penses are properly addresse 
Uniform Civil Liability for Sup? 
Code Ann. §§ TS—15—I throug 
As calculated from the inconu 
dren's parents (not former see: 
guidelines presumptively cover 
living expenses, including basi 
Ckrisiic7isen v. Christicnsziu 
593 (Utah 19S3). 
(7] The children's father, 
previous husband, is paving ch 
quired under the guidelines, 
stances have changed since the 
calculated. Mrs. Willey can see* 
cured by a trust deed against the h 
for the purchase of the couple's .x-
She contends the trial court sr 
have made Mr. Willey tr.dtvidua 
for the second mortgage. Ss'e c 
court abused iti discretion in div 
However, on remand, i; che co-
allocate a portion of this marita 
Willey. that decision must be cor 
ting the alimony award. 
WELLEY v. 
C l c e u i a * ?.2d 347 
of the support order. She should not, howev-
er, te *kte ^ -viviixs. M.r. WIU7 \^ V.^ .p 
support c^2 c—^-r2n through an alimony 
award. See, t.g, Sckerv. 3aJ<er, S65 ?.2d at 
546 (considering expenses of grandchildren 
living with spouse receiving alimony "would 
be tantamount to giving a child support 
award for the grandchildren"); see also Nee-
del v. XeedeL 15 Ariz.App. 471, 4S9 ?.2d 729, 
732 (1971) (rejecting attempt to introduce 
testimony about expenses of children from 
prior marriage); Braidel v. BrsnctL 555 
So.2d 1259, 1273 (Miss. 1990) (disallowing por-
tion of alimony that would have gone to 
expenses of child by former spouse); Shrib-
tier v. Skribwr, 153 N.J.Super. 374, 379 A.2d 
1044, 1045 (CLCh.Div.1977) (holding wife 
"should not be permitted to obtain through 
the back door what she cannot obtain direct-
B% tcwautatiQa of lacQrtve to Mr*. WilUy 
(3) Mrs. Willey contends the court im-
properly imputed to her a monthly income of 
$1500 to $2000 in setting her alimony award. 
She argues that the court's finding is based 
sotely upon speculation. We agree. 
At trial, Mr. Willey called Mrs. Wiley's 
current employer, who testified that if Mrs. 
Willey were employed full-time in the same 
position, she would make $300 per month 
gross income, but that no full-time sales or 
managerial positions were available for Mrs. 
Willey. Mrs. Willey called the director of 
human resources from a large Utah company 
to testify. This expert testified that a forty-
two-year-old woman with an outdated bache-
lor of arts degree, without marketable s'tdlls, 
and who had not bzzn employed full-time for 
ten years, needed at least three years of 
education to upgrade her skills, unless she is 
Xohe re\ega:ed 10 an unskilled sales or simi-
lar position. Tne trial court rejected this 
witness's testimony, finding it not credible in 
light of the witness's prior relationship with 
Mrs. V/illey and the fact that she was plan-
ning to charge Mrs. Willey $liCO for her 
services. Mrs. Willey testified that to earn a 
teacher's starJr.g salary of $1333 to $1500 a 
5. The:: 1$ r.o svidsnce that Mrs. Willsy had any 
foundation on uhtch to hue her es::.T.a:5 of a 
WILLEY Utah 553 
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ponth.5 she would need to complete :hir:y-
v^ V& •& forv> V.<t>sirb <&< ^ vvrv^Cv;* VAM: *i?i« 
versity program, which could be done in one 
year only if sh^ attended school full-time. 
She also testified chat a teacher's salary was 
not enough income for her to live on and thus 
she hoped to pursue other avenues of em-
ployment. 
Regarding NLrs. Wiiley's ability to earn 
income, the trial court stated: 
The court finds that the defendant is 
capable of earning income substantially in 
excess of that which is proposed here. 
Her earnings projection are ac the level of 
SS60.00. While there is not testimony of 
her having actively sought other income 
she described herself as a hobbyist. The 
court finds that she has previously worked 
in sales, in retail sales and clothing, that 
she works in a bookstore in sales, that she 
conducts classes . . . with interested per-
sons, and those yie'ld gTeater income. Tne 
court believes that it would not be unrea-
sonable to expect that her income could or 
should be in the range of $1,500 to $2,000 
per month based upon her education and 
her circumstances. I recognize that there 
may be a little bit of time necessary co get 
to that level, that starting a job takes a 
little time at a lower rate, but it should not 
be below SS60.00 and should certainly be 
within that level within 12 to 24 months. 
We cannot say the trial court abused its 
discretion in setting Mrs. Wiiley's earnings at 
SS50 per month based on a projection of full-
time work at her present salary'- See Thron-
son v. Thrmson. S10 P.2d 423, 435 (Utah 
Ap?.). cert denied S26 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
However, there is no basis for the trial 
court's finding that Mrs. Willey could earn 
$1500 to S2000 per month within a year or 
two. %Vehave previously he\d such a finding 
improper. In Sell v. BelL S10 ?.2d 439 
(Utah App.1991). the trial court imputed a 
$1500 income to Mrs. Bell, despite undisput-
ed testimony that she earned SS53 p^r month 
as a part-time teaching assistant at Utah 
State University. t± at 492 n. 2. The im-
puted income was based on the level i^i had 
:each:r's ssar.in; salary. 
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previously earned as a full-time sch:-:'. ceach-
er in another sate, appropriately r-o years 
before she filed for divorce from he: husband 
of cen years, id We no:ed cha; M(.-.]o expla-
nation was offered for this unusual (Ir.come) 
adjustment" 1<L 
Mrs. Willey^ circumstances are similar to 
Mrs. Bell's. Like Mrs. Bell, who began 
working part-time two years prior :O filing 
for divorce, Mrs. Willey worked pan-time 
during her marriage. Both possessed college 
degrees. However, unlike Mrs. Sell, Mrs. 
Willey never utilized her cwenty-year-oid ed-
ucation degree in an employment capacity. 
In Mrs. Bell's case, the trial cour. imputed 
an income she had actually earned on a full-
time basis three years before trial. Howev-
er, for Mrs. Willey, the trial cour. first im-
puted an income based on full-time employ-
ment at her current wage ($S60 per month), 
and then, without any factual basis, speculat-
ed that she could raise her income :o $1500 
to $2000 per month. 
The only evidence presented to suggest 
that she could earn income greater than $S60 
per month came from Mrs. Willey herself 
and from the witness whose testimony the 
court found not credible. If the tr.al coun 
relied on Mrs. WiHe/s testimony, it appears 
the court failed to take into account her 
statement that she could earn $1333 ;o $1500 
monthly as a starting teacher only ir.er at-
tending school for one year on a full-time 
basis, and then only if jobs were available. 
Funhermore, she had never taught school 
before, and there was no historical record of 
other earnings on which to base this rinding. 
We do not question the trial coun's au-
thority to impute income to Mrs. 'Willey. 
Imputing income to an unemployed or under-
employed spouse when setting an alimony 
award is conceptually appropriate as part of 
the determination of that spouse's ability to 
produce a sufficient income. See Bell, 810 
P.2d at 491-92. However, it cannot be prem-
ised upon mere conjecture; instead, it de-
mands a careful and precise assessment re-
quiring detailed findings. We have examined 
imputation in other contexts and outlined a 
detailed approach that, while not expressly 
applicable to the instant situation, should in-
form the trial court's assessment uson re-
mand. See, eg, nail v. Hal 
Adv.Rep. 29 (Utah App.1993) (L 
statutory guidelines and arJcui 
sary findings for imputation o 
parents in determining child 5 
gations); State v. Vincent S^  
(Utah App.1992) (describing fin 
King assessments of earning c 
other financial factors in deter 
gency for appointment of couns 
Such findings, however, are nc 
from the record before us. With 
are unable to see how the trial c 
ed income level follows from or 
by the evidence. Based on the 
record, we conclude that the 
jump to the higher salary ra 
abuse of discretion. See Rasbi 
band, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ap 
remand, the trial court may ba~ 
on Mrs. Wille/s $360 per mdn 
earnings or, should it wish to us-
income figure, hold funher evid-. 
ings to receive evidence on ^ 
future earning capacity consist 
cases cited above. 
F. Rehabilitative Alim 
[9,10] It is clear from the 
the alimony award that it was 
achieve a rehabilitative purpost 
no difficulty with a properly fas 
bilitative award under the facts 
However, to the extent the alim* 
incended to be rehabilitative. iL 
close the gap between actual e 
actual income to enable the rect 
to then be better able to suppor 
herself when the alimony and sc 
Bell v. Bell SiO P.2d 4S9. 492-9 
App.1991). Thus, the coun rr.iz 
istic assessments of actual cur 
and actual expenses. The cou: 
consider the time demands and 
attending school. Absent sucr 
ment and appropriate findings. 
basis on which to determine 
amount and duration of alimon 
achieve a rehabilitative outconv 
C. Summary 
A thorough review of the re 
that the court made no findim 
WILLEY v. 
either pare/5 reasonable financial needs, 
/r^ a court also failed to adjust eicher party's 
gaancial needs to account for the debt pay-
ments each would owe to Firs: Interstate 
after the court's property distribution. Fur-
^ e r # the trial court did not incorporate the 
contemplated debt arising from the sale of 
•ke marital home in the alimony determina-
tion. However, the court did not err in 
excluding evidence of the impact of Mrs. 
\V"die/s obligation to support her children 
from her previous marriage irr assessing the 
aopropriate alimony award. Finally, the 
court imputed income to Mrs. Volley that is 
unsupported by the record. Given the rec-
ord before us, we are simply unable to bal-
ance Mrs. Wille/s need and her ability to 
support herself against Mr. Wille/s ability to 
oay as required by Jones; consequently, we 
cannot determine whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in setting the amount 
and duration of the alimony award. We 
therefore reverse and remand the alimony 
award for additional findings on each of the 
Jones factors and a reassessment of the ali-
mony award in light of those findings and our 
decision. 
II. PREMARITAL EQUITY 
(11) Mrs. Willey next contends the trial 
court abused its discretion by failing to rec-
ognize her equity in the marital home de-
rived from proceeds of the sale of her pre-
marital home. Mr. Willey responds that the 
evidence supports the trial court's finding 
chat Mrs. Wille/s premarital equity has lost 
its separate character as premarital proper-
ty. We affirm the trial court's ruling on the 
basis that any premarital equity was con-
sumed during the marriage. 
"Generally, the rule for premarital proper-
ty is that each party retain the separate 
property he or she brought into the mar-
riage." Dunn v. Duiin, S02 P.2d 1314, 1321 
(Utah App.1990). However, if the "property 
has been consumed or its identity lost 
through commingling or exchanges'* it no 
longer falls within the rule. Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 303 (Utah 193S) 
(emphasis added). 
Although the trial court found the funds 
had lost their identity through commingling, 
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the evidence shows that they were actually 
consumed, i.e., the equity was used for vari-
ous expenses during the course of the mar-
riage. Therefore, we affirm the court's re-
jection of Mrs. Wille/s claim on that basis. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES 
A. Fees Through Trial 
[12,13] Mrs. Willey maintains tha; the 
trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
her only SoOCO in attorney fees when she 
submitted evidence supporting her claim for 
$19,215. A trial court may award attorney 
ta^s in divorce proceedings. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-3 (Supp.1993). 'The award must be 
based on evidence of the financial need of the 
receiving spouse, the ability of the other 
spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested ie>ts.n Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 439, 
493 (Utah App.1991). 'The decision to make 
such an award and the amount thereof rest 
primarily in the sound discretion of the trial 
court" fd However, "(t]o permit meaning-
ful review of the trial court's discretionary 
ruling, *(w]e have consistently encouraged 
trial courts to make findings to explain the 
factors which they considered relevant in 
arriving at an attorney fee award.'" Id. at 
494 (quoting Regional Sales Agenrj, Inc. v. 
Reickert, 7S4 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah App. 
19S9)). 
A court may consider, among other factors, 
the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency 
of the attorneys, the reasonableness of the 
number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality, the 
amount involved in the case and the result 
attained, and the expertise and experience 
of the attorneys involved. 
Id 810 P.2d at 493-94. . 
[14] Mrs. Willey testified that she 
thought her attorney fees were reasonable. 
Counsel for Mrs. Willey made a proffer at 
trial concerning his $19,215 bill for legal ser-
vices and testified that he had spent 123.1 
hours on the case. Counsel's documented 
time was billed at $150 per hour. Counsel 
for Mr. Willey challenged the reasonableness 
of opposing counsel's expenses, activities, and 
billing rats. However, the trial court did not 
indeoendentlv assess either this testimony or 
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KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN P. WILLEY ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY ] 
Defendant. ] 
ORDER 
Civil No. 91 490 0101 
i Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiffs and defendant's objections to the commissioner's recommendation 
came before the court for hearing on March 5,1993, pursuant to notice. Plaintiff was 
present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock, and defendant was present 
and represented by her counsel, Roger D. Sandack. The Honorable David S. Young 
presided. The court having reviewed the file herein and heard the arguments of 
counsel, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs objection to the commissioner's recommendation is granted. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against defendant in the amount of 
$18,840.86 and may offset against that amount the alimony he would otherwise be 
required to pay to defendant. 
3. Plaintiff shall pay $500 in alimony to defendant for March and may offset 
the remaining $500 that would otherwise be part of his March alimony obligation 
against the judgment. 
4. Plaintiff presently has in his possession tax refund checks from the United 
States in the amount of $1,132 and the State of Utah in the amount of $639. 
Defendant's share of those tax refund checks should also be offset against the 
judgment, and defendant should be ordered to endorse the checks so that can be 
accomplished. 
5. Defendant's objection to the commissioner's recommendation is denied. 
DATED this ^ davofMftfcfel993. 




JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to 
the following, postage prepaid, this 5th day of March, 1993: 
Roger D. Sandack, Esq. 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
r -* u { 
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Tab 6 
ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLENP.WILLEY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) PRETRIAL ORDER 
vs. ) 
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY, ) Civil No. 91 490 0101 DA 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant. ) Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
The decree of divorce was entered by this court in this matter on January, 14, 1992. 
Defendant appealed the final divorce decree entered by this court to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
and the Court of Appeals remanded to this court on November 29, 1993, for further findings on 
three issues: 
a. The award of alimony; 
b. The allocation of certain debts; and 
c. Defendant's attorney's fees. 
Specifically, this court was directed to make additional findings on the following: 
a. The financial needs of both parties; 
b. The reasonableness of each party's expenses; 
0 ft ft o s o 
ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) PRETRIAL ORDER 
1 Civil No. 91 490 0101 DA 
Judge David S. Young 
1 Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
The decree of divorce was entered by this court in this matter on January, 14, 1992. 
Defendant appealed the final divorce decree entered by this court to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
and the Court of Appeals remanded to this court on November 29, 1993, for further findings on 
three issues: 
a. The award of alimony; 
b. The allocation of certain debts; and 
c. Defendant's attorney's fees. 
Specifically, this court was directed to make additional findings on the following: 
a. The financial needs of both parties; 
b. The reasonableness of each party's expenses; 
000952 
(iii) Plaintiff, 
e. Defendant will call the following witnesses: 
(i) The parties; 
(ii) Defendant's attorney; 
(iii) Rebuttal vocational expert, if necessary; and 
(iv) Roxanne Hanson. 
DATED this fo^day of October, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ELLEN MAYCOCK" 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 











Rebuttal vocational expert, if necessary; and 
Roxanne Hanson. 
jS^fday of October, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
J U D G E D S ^ ^ 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. Y ^ N T ^ ^ 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower ^ J ^ l F ^ ' 
50 West Broadway ~^* 




Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Tab 7 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN P. WILLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 




The above-entitled matter came on for hearing after remand 
from the Court of Appeals the 17th day of November, 1994, pursuant 
to Notice. The plaintiff was present and represented by his 
attorney Ellen Maycock, the defendant was present and represented 
by her attorney Roger D. Sandack. 
On remand from the Utah Court of Appeals, (Willey v. Willey, 
866 P2d 547 [Utah App. 1993]) the trial court was asked to make 
findings with respect to the following: 
1. The reasonable financial needs of the parties. 
2. The division of the parties' debt as it affects the award 
of alimony. 
3. The imputation of income to the defendant. 
4. The ability of each party to pay the defendant's 
attorney's fees. 
0 G 0 9 S 2 
5. The reasonableness of those fees. 
A Brief History of the Case 
The Parties separated in November of 1990 and the Plaintiff 
(husband) filed for divorce January 8, 1991. Both parties had 
been previously married and the defendant had children who were 
supported, in part, by the plaintiff during the marriage. The 
parties were married to each other on the 29th of April, 1982. 
No children were born as issue of this marriage. The parties at 
the time of separation had lived together for eight and one-half 
years. The original case was tried November 21-22, 1991. The 
Decree of Divorce was entered January 14, 1992. The defendant 
appealed the Trial Court's decision. The Court of Appeals 
"reverse(d) and remand(ed) the court's rulings on alimony and the 
award of attorney fees" and also requested the trial court to 
"reconsider" the division of property as it would effect the 
issues of alimony and fees. The Appeals Court remanded the case 
for the entry of findings on "...(1) the award of alimony, (2) 
the allocation of debt, and (3) the award of attorneys fees at 
trial and on appeal." The case was "otherwise affirm(ed.)" 
This court asked Counsel to list the issues they thought 
should be reviewed and they provided five (5) areas as discussed 
hereafter. 
2 
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Facts and Ruling on Remand 
1. The reasonable financial needs of the parties. 
Defendant submitted exhibit 3 6-D as a summary of both 
parties' monthly expenses. The court finds that the parties' 
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Housecleaning.... 40.00 40 . 00 
TOTALS $2,4 63.16 $2,678.41 
The figures above were initially prepared by and presented 
by the Plaintiff. Thereafter the defendant simply adopted the 
plaintiff's expenses as hers with minor adjustments. This method 
is not to be preferred as it does not require the defendant to 
critically analyze her reasonable expenses and present them to 
the court. However, under the circumstances, the court has no 
other choice than to accept them with the following comment. 
The court finds these expenses to be "reasonable" but notes 
that both parties have high automobile expenses and the 
defendant's medical expenses surely must not be a monthly ongoing 
amount of $660.00 per month. The record shows the defendant had 
major surgery in the fall of 1991 but nothing is reflected as to 
why the ongoing expenses would continue on a monthly basis. 
The court concludes that each party, in order to maintain a 
standard of living consistent with both the expectations during 
marriage and the financial circumstances of the parties should 
incur reasonable monthly living expenses of $2,000.00. This 
number is arrived at for the defendant by reducing the monthly 
medical bills to $60.00 and reducing the automobile expense by 
$80.00 per month. The plaintiff's automobile expenses can be 
similarly adjusted down to reach the figure of $2,000.00 per 
4 
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month for him. 
2. Division of the parties debts as it affects the award of 
alimony. 
The focus of the review of debts was to be to examine how 
payment of those debts would affect the ability of the Plaintiff 
to render alimony and of the defendant to earn sufficient income 
to pay a share of the debts. 
At the time of the divorce (though the parties lived 
otherwise due to expenditures beyond their income and beyond 
their cash flow) the parties had virtually no net worth. The 
home was represented at trial as an asset with a presumed equity. 
This was not found to be true through the experience of sale. 
The parties, after separation needed to sell the home. While the 
defendant states that she was interested in the speedy sale of 
the home, the record seems to belie that assertion. 
On July 17, 1992 Presiding Judge Michael Murphy held an 
emergency hearing regarding the sale of the home. The Judge 
concluded that the home was listed too high at $350,000.00. 
After hearing the testimony of Ms. Sue Christensen of The Ramsey 
Group Judge Murphy concluded that, "...the parties could not 
reasonably expect to receive a gross sales price greater than 
$330,000.00 and the house may sell for $300,000.00." 
5 
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Due to the conflicts between the parties in arriving at an 
agreed sales price, Judge Murphy ordered, "Ms. Christensen is 
authorized to accept a price as low as $300,000.00 if, in her 
discretion and judgment, that is the best price she reasonably 
believes she can currently obtain for the house.11 
At the time of trial in November of 1991, the home had a 
first mortgage of approximately $232,000.00 and a second mortgage 
of approximately $80,000.00. During the period of separation, 
the amount paid on the second mortgage, which was owed to the 
defendant's mother, was not able to be paid to her but was paid 
instead in temporary support to the defendant. The unpaid amount 
continued to accrue interest and was paid to the defendant's 
mother upon sale of the home. 
The parties now acknowledge that the home sold October 5, 
1992. After paying the mortgages and the costs of sale, a 
deficiency on the home remained in the amount of $28,113.71 of 
which, due to the date of sale and the language of the Decree of 
Divorce, each party was obligated for $14,056.86. The plaintiff 
has paid the entire amount. 
In addition to the deficiency on the home there remained a 
credit line to First Interstate Bank. Each party was obligated 
to pay one-half of the balance of $9,568.00. The entire amount 
was liquidated by the plaintiff requiring him to pay $4,784.00 
6 
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for the defendant. 
At this time, the plaintiff has paid on the defendant's 
behalf, $14,056.86 for the mortgage deficiency and $4,784.00 for 
the First Interstate Bank balance. These combined amount to 
$18,84 0.86. It is the court's further understanding that no 
marital debts remain unpaid. The plaintiff has satisfied them 
all. During the entire period of separation, the plaintiff paid 
the monthly mortgage payments of $2,485.55 which for some 11 
months until sale amounted to $27,341.05. All of that amount was 
lost (except for the interest expense benefit) in the sale which 
resulted the deficiency of $28,113.71. 
Substantial sums have now been paid by the plaintiff to 
liquidate the family obligations and the court finds that it is 
reasonable to deny any further repayment by the defendant to the 
plaintiff. The defendant is thus awarded $18,840.86 in value. 
At the present time, it does not appear that the division of 
debts has a continuing bearing on the issue of alimony. 
3. The imputation of income to the defendant. 
At the time of trial, the plaintiff was employed as a stock 
broker. The Court made findings that his income over the relevant 
period of time yielded an average of $110,000 per year. The 
defendant worked part time in a book store. 
7 
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The defendant, in addition to being a part time book store 
salesperson, conducted literature discussion groups for 
additional income. She was paid $5.00 per hour for her work in 
sales, and received varying amounts of income, depending upon the 
number of persons who attended the discussion groups. The 
defendant's employer was unable to employ her "full-time," and 
the defendant took no steps during the parties' separation to 
obtain alternative employment or to enhance her employability 
through education. Indeed, since the parties separation in 1991 
to the present time she remains in the same employment and 
without having made any further effort to seek rehabilitative 
education in order to enhance her employment skills or 
opportunities. 
Prior to the parties' marriage, the defendant worked in 
retail clothing sales at Nordstroms Department Store. Shortly 
after marriage she terminated her full-time employment and began 
to pursue actively her literary interests. This decision caused 
great stress in the parties' relationship. The plaintiff 
continually requested that the defendant continue her education, 
and/or return to work which she refused to do. 
The defendant's income for the years 1982 through 1991 as 
contained in defendant's Exhibit 34-D, showed an average annual 
income of $4,135.75. Her income in 1991 was $6,287.00. 
8 
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At the hearing, Ms. Connie Romboy was called as a career 
guidance counselor to provide information as to the employability 
of the defendant. 
Ms. Romboy's test evaluations indicated that Ms. Willey 
enjoys superior learning potential, and ranked in the 95th 
percentile, compared to persons of her own age. She further 
found that she was well-adjusted and stable in her personality 
factors. Her scores indicated skills in management, teaching and 
social services. Ms. Romboy testified that Ms. Willey's 
vocational barriers were precisely the same now as existed in 
November of 1991. Ms. Romboy's report indicates that had Ms. 
Willey chosen to quit her job at the book store and look for 
other work, she could have obtained work with her then existing 
skills in employment, carrying a low income of $4.25 per hour as 
a sales clerk, to a high of $6.17 as a customer service 
representative. The average of the rates suggested is $5.32 per 
hour, and over the three intervening years, a 3.5% annual 
increase could reasonably have been expected. Thus, the present 
earning capacity of Ms. Willey should be $5.90 per hour, or 
$12,325.08 per annum, or $1,027.09 per month. This earning would 
be so if Ms. Willey had not pursued further education which she 
did not do. Ms. Willey is thus imputed to have earnings of 
$11,108.16 for 1991; $11,496.95 for 1992; $11,889.34 for 1993; 
9 
0 0 0 9 9 0 
and, $12,315.82 if working full time. 
After trial, the defendant received $1,500 per month alimony 
for one year from January 1992 to January 1993. Thereafter she 
received $1,000 per month for three years or until January 1996. 
Thus the schedule of monthly income imputed to the defendant 
for each of the years in question is as follows: 
Year Earnings Alimony Total 
1992 $ 958.08 $1,500.00 $2,458.08 
1993 991.61 1,000.00 1,991.61 
1994 1,026.32 1,000.00 2,026.32 
1995 1,062.24 1,000.00 2,062.24 
Had Ms. Willey pursued her education, she would have 
enhanced her earning capacities within one year as a school 
teacher, to $6.70 per hour; and, within two years to somewhere 
between $9.58 and $12.41 per hour, had she sought education to 
become either a marketing expert or social worker. 
Ms. Willey expressed no interest in becoming a school 
teacher, and since it would not provide as much earning potential 
as the other alternatives, the Court would find it reasonable for 
her to have anticipated pursuing education for two years in order 
to qualify for a higher paying job. She apparently has chosen 
neither educational option to date. 
The court thus concludes that, consistent with the testimony 
10 
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of Ms. Romboy, Ms. Willey's imputed income today should be $5.90 
per hour or $12,315.82 per annum. 
4. The ability of each party to pay the marital debts and 
the defendant's attorney's fees. 
For the purposes of this analysis, the plaintiff at trial 
was determined to earn $110,000.00 per year. The defendant is 
imputed to have earnings of $12,315.82 if working full time. 
Each party received a lump sum of $6,562.3 9 representing 
one-half of the plaintiff's 1992 employment bonus. 
Had Ms. Willey pursued her education immediately upon 
separation, she could have earned in 1994 as a school teacher 
$1,165.80 per month, and in 1995 and thereafter as a marketing 
expert or social worker $1,913.13 per month. 
The defendant retained all the furniture, furnishings and 
fixtures not conveyed on sale, and other incidental personal 
property in the way of household supplies, kitchenware, and tools 
etc., from the party's home. These were retained without lien or 
encumbrance. 
The Plaintiff was awarded eight (8) specifically named items 
of personal property of an unknown dollar value. The court 
ignores the value of this division of personal property in 
considering either parties ability to pay for the marital debts 
11 
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or attorney's fees. 
At this time, only the plaintiff is able to pay toward 
marital debts due to his higher income and the fact that the 
defendant has not sought to improve her income through either 
efforts in employment or improved education and skills. 
5. The reasonableness of those fees* 
The attorney's fees in this case constitute a matter of 
considerable concern to the court. The court is well aware that 
a broader discretionary award of reimbursement in fees is allowed 
in domestic cases over other civil cases. (see Peterson v. 
Peterson, 818 P2d 1305 [Utah App. 1991]) The policy makes 
considerable sense since the trial courts are charged with making 
equitable divisions of property when marriages fail and likewise 
courts should make equitable assessments of financial 
responsibility for payment of attorneys fees. 
A great problem is encountered when the fees are greatly out 
of proportion to the marital estate and the present and future 
financial circumstances of the parties. 
In this case, we have a plaintiff with considerable earnings 
potential. We have a defendant with remarkable skills (95th 
percentile of her age group) and yet having little history of 
employment and apparently little desire to seek to maximize her 
12 
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earnings potential through education or other training. 
In examining the legal work, the court notes that the 
District Court's file is now contained in two (2) large volumes. 
The docket alone shows entries amounting to seven (7) pages of 
docket entries describing pleadings and filing activity; and, in 
addition, the parties have been to court or had hearings set 
sixteen (16) different times. This activity includes only the 
District Court and not the Court of Appeals. 
One may ask if this case contained unusual or particular 
issues of law that may not have otherwise been considered at 
trial or on appeal? Throughout the initial proceeding and on 
appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had a continuing 
obligation to pay support for her children of a prior marriage. 
That matter was rejected by the Trial Court and by the Appeals 
Court. The defendant did however, prevail on issues as to the 
adequacy of the findings of fact before the trial court. This 
hearing was therefore necessitated on remand. 
This court may further consider the "difficulty of the 
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness 
of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality, the amount involved in the case, the 
result attained, and the expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved." (Bell v. Bell, 810 P2d. 489 at p 493-4) 
13 
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In applying these factors, the court finds that this case 
was not and should not have been particularly difficult. It was 
a relatively routine divorce of a couple with extreme financial 
difficulties and disagreements on how to manage their income and 
expenses. 
The attorneys efficiency in handling the case was not good. 
The defendant's attorney requested trial fees of $19,215.00. The 
present affidavit shows 240.1 hours at a billing rate of 
$150.00 per hour which results in a fee of $36,015.00. I 
recognize that for some of the hours in the present affidavit, 
defendant's counsel is not requesting payment, however, he is 
requesting payment for 101 hours for $15,150.00 with additional 
costs of $1,539.38 for a total of $16,689.38. This amount is 
presumably in addition to the $5,000.00 paid after the initial 
trial. 
The reasonableness of the number of hours seems excessive 
and beyond a reasonable evaluation of the case. 
The rate of $150.00 per hour for the experience of 
defendant's counsel is high but within reasonable rates. 
The amount involved in the case, considering the marital 
estate, can in no wise justify the fees incurred. The parties 
net worth approached zero. The only meaningful asset was the 
plaintiff's earning capacity which he had before the marriage and 
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obviously brought into the marriage. 
The result attained leads one to conclude that since the 
matter was sent back on appeal for further findings that, in that 
respect, the defendant prevailed. However, the entire financial 
condition of the parties cannot justify combined attorneys fees 
in excess of $65,000.00 with little or no marital property 
remaining. 
Thus the court finds the fees are not reasonable and are not 
appropriate as a measure of this case. 
Ruling at the Conclusion of the Remand 
Based upon the forgoing findings, the court rules as 
follows: 
1. The reasonable financial need of the parties for 
monthly income is $2,000.00 each. 
2. The division of the parties debt is not to be further 
reconsidered. The debt paid by the plaintiff shall remain as 
paid and the plaintiff's claim for contribution from the 
defendant is barred. Thus the amount of $18,840.86 shall remain 
as now paid and the defendant shall be discharged therefrom. 
3. The imputation of income to the defendant shall remain 
in the annual amount of $12,315.82. Had the defendant pursued 
promptly either of the educational directions presented by Ms. 
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Romboy she would be earning between $16,500 and $23,800.00 at 
this time. 
4. The court finds that the ability of the defendant to 
pay attorneys fees is minimal. On that basis, and viewing the 
case as it now stands, (rather than as we all wish it were,) the 
court orders the plaintiff to pay an additional amount to the 
defendant for attorney's fees of $10,000.00. This combined with 
the prior amount shall mean that the plaintiff shall pay to the 
defendant the total amount of $15,000.00 toward her attorney's 
fees. The Court feels that this is an equitable amount 
considering the incomes of the parties and the other matters 
discussed above. Of course, the Court recognizes that each party 
is responsible for the payment of fees incurred independent of 
this award. 
5. The court finds the reasonableness of the fees to be 
out of line with the true value of the case and with the parties 
ability to pay. This case should have been viewed more 
objectively early on and the parties and their attorneys should 
not have allowed the case to arrive at this point with combined 
attorney's fees in excess of $55,000.00. 
6. One final matter shall be dealt with and that is the 
alimony and the concept of "rehabilitative alimony." 
The Alimony shall not be increased due to the substantial 
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payments of marital debt the plaintiff has already paid. 
Naturally, it would be better for the defendant to enhance 
her skills through obtaining further education. Even though she 
has had opportunities during and after the marriage to do so, she 
has not chosen to pursue those opportunities to date. To assist 
her in that respect, should she desire to do so, the court orders 
the plaintiff to pay tuition and books for a period of nine (9) 
quarters at the University of Utah or some comparable university. 
This option must be completed within five (5) years of this date. 
While a fully matriculated student, the plaintiff shall pay 
$500.00 per month as additional alimony for financial assistance. 
Ms. Maycock is requested to prepare findings and an order 
consistent herewith and with the record at trial and on remand. 
Dated this 3/^aav of January 19 95.^ -re 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of , 
-2/sr 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this J\ 
day of January, 1995: 
Ellen Maycock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 W. Broadway, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
Roger D. Sandack 
Attorney for Defendant 
170 S. Main, Suite 400 
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ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY, 
Defendant. 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 91 490 0101 DA 
Judge David S. Young 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for hearing on November 17, 1994. 
pursuant to notice. The Honorable David S. Young presided. Plaintiff was present and 
represented by his counsel. Ellen Maycock. and defendant was present and represented by her 
counsel, Roger D. Sandack. 
This matter was before the court on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court 
of Appeals held that additional findings of fact were necessary with respect to the issues of 
alimony and attorneys' fees, and specifically directed this court to make such findings on the 
following issues: 
(i) the reasonable financial needs of each of the parties; 
(ii) the division of the parties' debt as it affects the award of alimony; 
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(iii) the imputation of income to the defendant; 
(iv) the ability of each party to pay defendant's attorney's fees; and 
(v) the reasonableness of those fees. 
The court was also directed to consider the award of attorney's fees on appeal. 
The Court of Appeals invited this court to receive additional evidence with respect to the 
imputation of income to defendant and the court did hear such evidence. The court having heard 
the testimony of witnesses, received exhibits, and reviewed the original record of the trial of this 
matter which took place on November 21 and 22, 1991. now makes and enters the following: 
Findings of Fact 
1. The parties were married on April 29, 19S2. 
2. Each party has been married previously. Defendant had three children from her 
prior marriage. 
3. No children were bom as issue of the marriage. 
4. The parties separated in November 1990, and plaintiff filed for divorce on 
January 8, 1991. 
5. A decree of divorce was entered on January 14, 1992. 
6. At the time of trial, defendant was employed part-time in a bookstore as a sales 
person and conducting literature discussion groups. She was paid S5.00 per hour for her work as 
a sales person and varying amounts for conducting the discussion groups depending upon the 
number of persons who attended. Defendant's employer, the owner of the bookstore, testified 
that no full-time positions were available. Defendant considered her work at the bookstore a 
hobby. Despite these facts, defendant took no steps during the parties' separation to obtain other 
employment. 
7. Prior to the marriage of the parties, defendant worked at retail clothing stores and 
was able to support herself in that work. At the time of trial, defendant also worked part-time at 
a store selling expensive clothing in trade for the clothing she received. 
8. At the time of trial, plaintiff was employed as a stock broker with an average 
income of S110.000 per year. 
9. Since the parties' divorce, defendant has taken no steps to become employed full 
time or to increase her income through training or education. At the present time, defendant 
remains in the same employment at the bookstore and has made no effort to seek rehabilitative 
education in order to enhance her employment skills or opportunities to seek other employment. 
10. During the parties' marriage, plaintiff continually requested that defendant 
continue her education and/or return to work, which she refused to do. 
11. At the hearing in 1994, Ms. Connie Romboy, a qualified vocational evaluator 
employed by the Career Guidance Center, testified concerning the employability of the defendant 
and her income earning ability. Ms. Romboy:s test and evaluations indicated that defendant 
enjoys superior learning potential and ranked in the ninety-fifth percentile compared to persons 
of her own age. She further found that defendant is well-adjusted and stable in her personality 
factors. Defendant's scores indicated skills in management, teaching, and social services. Ms. 
Romboy's report indicated that, had defendant chosen to quit her job in the bookstore before or 
at the time of trial and seek other employment, she could have obtained work with her then 
existing skills earning an income between S4.25 per hour as a sales clerk and $6.17 per hour as a 
customer service representative. The average of the rates is S5.32 per hour and over the three 
intervening years, a 3.5% annual increase could reasonably have been expected. Accordingly, 
the court finds that the present earning capacity of defendant should be S5.90 per hour or 
SI2.325.08 per annum, or 51,027.09 per month, assuming defendant did not pursue further 
education, which she did not. 
12. The court imputes earnings to defendant of $11,108.16 for 1991, SI 1,496.95 for 
1992. SI 1,889.34 for 1993, and 512,315.82 for 1994, if working full time. 
13. At trial, defendant was awarded 51,500 per month alimony for one year from 
November 1991 to November 1992. Thereafter, she was awarded 51,000 per month for three 
years until November 1995. Accordingly, the schedule of monthly income imputed to defendant 
for the years in question is as follows: 
Year Earnings Alimonv Total 
1992 5 958.08 51,500.00 52,458.08 
1993 991.61 1,000.00 1,991.61 
1994 1,026.32 1,000.00 2,026.32 
1995 1,062.24 1,000.00 2,062.24 
In addition, plaintiff paid the mortgage payment for the parties' home through October of 1992, 
thus decreasing defendant's expenses for that period. In addition, defendant received S6.562.39 
as additional alimony in 1992, in that she received one-half of plaintiff s bonus. 
14. Defendant has a bachelor's degree. She could enhance her earning capacities 
through obtaining further education, although she has chosen not to pursue those opportunities to 
date. For example, according to Ms. Romboy, had defendant pursued her education, she could 
have obtained a teaching certificate within one year and enhanced her earning capacities as a 
school teacher to 56.70 per hour. Within two years, she could have enhanced her earning 
capacity to somewhere between S9.58 and 512.41 per hour, had she sought education to become 
either a marketing expert or social worker. 
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15. So that defendant may continue her education, it is reasonable for plaintiff to pay 
the costs of tuition and books for defendant for a period of nine quarters at the University of Utah 
or some comparable university, providing such education is completed within five years of 
January 31. 1995, to assist defendant in enhancing her earning potential. 
16. Under the present circumstances, the alimony obligation of plaintiff to defendant 
should not be increased due in part to the substantial payment of marital debt that plaintiff has 
already made. However, if defendant seeks to enhance her skills through obtaining further 
education and becomes a fully matriculated student, the court finds that it is reasonable for 
plaintiff to pay to defendant S500 per month as additional alimony for financial assistance for a 
maximum of nine quarters to be completed within five years following the date of this order. 
17. At trial, plaintiff testified that his monthly expenses were $2,463.16 and defendant 
testified that her monthly expenses were S2.678.41. 
18. The court finds plaintiffs automobile expense of S793 per month is unreasonably 
high and should be reduced to S329.84 per month. 
19. The court finds that defendant's automobile expense of $381.83 is unreasonably 
high and should be reduced to $300 per month. Also, defendant's monthly unreimbursed 
medical/dental expenses of $660 per month are unreasonably high and should be reduced to $60 
per month. While the record shows that defendant had major surgery in the fall of 1991, there is 
nothing in the record to establish why the ongoing expenses would continue on a monthly basis. 
20. During the marriage, the parties maintained their standard of living by incurring 
debt. 
21. The court finds that, in order to maintain a reasonable standard of living 
consistent with both the expectations during the marriage and the financial circumstances of the 
parties, the reasonable monthly living expenses for each party are S2.000. 
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22. In addition, from the time of trial in November of 1991 through October of 1992, 
plaintiff paid the mortgage payment on the home where defendant was residing. Thus, her 
monthly expenses for that time period were reduced by S610 per month. Thus, her monthly 
expenses during that time period were SI,400 per month and she received SI,500 per month as 
alimony. In addition, the court has imputed income to defendant for 1992 of S958 per month. 
23. The court finds that the alimony paid to defendant and to be paid in the future is 
sufficient, together with the income imputed to her, to meet her needs. 
24. The court finds it reasonable that defendant would have anticipated pursuing 
education for two years in order to qualify for a higher paying job. If she had done so, she would 
now be able to meet her own financial needs. 
25. After the parties' separated, there were not sufficient marital assets to adequately 
support the parties and it was necessary for them to sell the marital home. 
26. The home was listed for sale at a selling price of S350,000. 
27. Defendant refused to consider a lower offer to purchase the marital home and an 
emergency hearing regarding the sale of the home was held on July 17, 1992, before Judge 
Michael R. Murphy because Judge Young was out of town. 
28. Judge Murphy concluded that the home was listed too high at S350,000 and. 
based on the testimony of Ms. Sue Christensen of the Ramsey Group, the parties should expect 
to sell the house for between S300,000 and 5330,000. 
29. Judge Murphy authorized Ms. Christensen to accept a price as low as S300.000 if 
she reasonably believed that was the best price she could obtain for the house. 
30. From the time of separation until the house sold, plaintiff paid the monthly 
mongage payments of S2,485.55. The cost to plaintiff was S57,167.65. Plaintiff paid this entire 
amount as a loss. 
31. The home sold on October 5, 1992. The proceeds of the sale were not adequate to 
pay the outstanding liens and the costs of sale. A deficiency on the home remained in the 
amount of S28,l 13.71. Pursuant to the decree of divorce, each party was ordered to pay one-half 
of this debt. 
32. Plaintiff paid this entire deficiency amount without reimbursement from 
defendant. 
33. As of the time of trial, the parties owed S9,568 to First Interstate Bank. Pursuant 
to the decree of divorce, each party was ordered to pay one-half of this debt. 
34. Plaintiff paid the entire debt to First Interstate without reimbursement from 
defendant. 
35. Plaintiff paid to defendant one-half of his 1992 employment bonus. She received 
S6,562.39. 
36. Defendant was awarded nearly all of the furniture, furnishings, and fixtures not 
conveyed on sale, and other incidental personal property in the way of household supplies, 
kitchenware. and tools from the parties' home. She received these without lien or encumbrance. 
37. Plaintiff was awarded eight specifically named items of personal property of an 
unknown dollar value. 
38. The court finds that the value of the personal property awarded to each party 
should not be considered in determining the parties' abilities to pay for the marital debts. 
39. The court finds that based on plaintiffs higher income and the fact that defendant 
has not sought to improve her income through efforts to obtain alternate employment or 
improved education and skills, defendant is not able to pay toward the marital debts. 
40. Accordingly, the court finds that given the fact that plaintiff has already paid the 
marital debts and given the court's findings with respect to alimony and to defendant's 
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reasonable needs and ability to earn income, it is reasonable that defendant be awarded the value 
of one-half of the amount of marital debts paid by plaintiff in the amount of SI 8.840.86 and that 
defendant not be required to repay this amount to plaintiff. 
41. With respect to the issue of the reasonableness of attorneys' fees, the court notes 
that the district court's file is contained in two large volumes. There are seven pages of docket 
entries describing pleadings and filing activity*. There have been sixteen court appearances in 
District Court alone, in addition to the activity in the Court of Appeals. 
42. With respect to unusual or particular issues of law, defendant argued that plaintiff 
had a continuing obligation to pay support for her children from a prior marriage. This assertion 
was rejected by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. 
43. The most recent hearing was necessitated by defendant's challenging and 
prevailing on the adequacy of the findings of fact before the trial court. 
44. In applying the factors to be considered in making an award of attorney's fees, the 
court finds that this case was not and should not have been particularly difficult. It was a 
relatively routine divorce of a couple with extreme financial difficulties and disagreements on 
how to manage their incomes and expenses. 
45. The court further finds that the efficiency of the attorneys in handling the case was 
not good and the reasonableness of the number of hours is excessive and beyond a reasonable 
evaluation of the case. 
46. At the time of trial, defendant's attorney requested fees of 519,215.00. The 
present affidavit shows 240.1 hours at a billing rate of SI50.00 per hour which results in fees of 
S36,015.00. 
47. While defendant's attorney does not request payment for all recorded hours, he 
does request payment for 101 hours in the amount of S15.150.00 for fees and costs of $1,539.38 
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for a total of SI 6,689.38. This amount is presumably in addition to the S5,000.00 already paid 
by plaintiff for defendant's attorney's fees after the trial. 
48. The court finds that the rate of SI50 per hour for the experience of defendant's 
counsel is high, but within reasonable range. 
49. However, the amount of attorneys' fees charged in this case, considering the 
marital estate, cannot justify the fees incurred. The parties' net worth approached zero and the 
only meaningful asset was the plaintiffs earning capacity which he brought into the marriage. 
The court finds that the entire financial condition of the parties cannot justify combined 
attorneys' fees in excess of $65,000, with little or no marital property remaining. Accordingly, 
the court finds the fees are not reasonable. 
50. The ability of defendant to pay attorney's fees is minimal and the court finds it 
reasonable that plaintiff should pay an additional amount to defendant for attorney's fees in the 
amount of SI0,000. In making this award, the court has considered the fcts incurred on appeal. 
This amount, combined with the prior amount plaintiff was ordered to pay, shall mean that 
plaintiff shall pay to defendant a total amount of SI 5.000 towards her attorney's fees. The court 
finds that this is an equitable amount concerning the incomes of the parties and the other matters 
discussed above. 
51. The court recognizes that each party is responsible for the payment of fees 
incurred independent of this award. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes the following: 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The original findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree in this matter should 
be amended to delete the requirement that defendant pay one-half of the First Interstate Bank 
obligation and one-half of the deficiency incurred in connection with the sale of the home. 
2. The alimony award of SI,500 per month for one year from the date of trial and 
SI .000 per month for three years thereafter was proper and is affirmed. 
3. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay the costs of tuition and books for defendant for 
a period of nine quarters at the University of Utah or a comparable university, providing such 
education is completed within five years of January 31, 1995, to assist defendant in enhancing 
her earning potential. 
4. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to defendant additional alimony in the amount 
of S500 per month while defendant is a fully matriculated student for a maximum of nine 
quarters to be completed within five years following the date of this order. 
5. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to defendant additional attorney's fees in the 
amount of SI 0,000. 
DATED this 1 .1995. 
/ ^ " t V T H E COURT: V-
JUDGE D.AVID si YQ^ft^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be delivered, by hand, to the following, this 14th 
day of February. 1995: 
Roger D. Sandack, Esq. 
First Interstate Plaza. Suite 400 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN P. WILLEY, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 




DECREE OF DIVORCE 
ON REMAND S U ^ ^ 
Civil No. 91 490 0101 D A ^ " ^ ° ~ ^ 0 a ° ' > 
Judse David S. Youn° 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for hearing on remand from the Court of 
Appeals on November 17, 1994. Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, Ellen 
Maycock, and defendant was present and represented by her counsel, Roger D. Sandack. The 
court having heard the testimony of witnesses, received exhibits, and heretofore entered its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant additional attorney's fees in the amount of 
SI 0.000. 
2. Defendant shall not be required to pay one-half of the First Interstate Bank 
obligation and one-half of the deficiency incurred in connection with the sale of the marital 
residence. The amount of SI8,840.86, representing defendant's original share of these 
obligations, shall be considered to be awarded to her. 
3. In the event that defendant decides to continue her education, plaintiff is ordered 
to pay tuition and books for a period of nine quarters for defendant at the University of Utah or a 
comparable university. Defendant must complete this education within five years of January' 31, 
1995. In addition, during the time that defendant is a fully-matriculated student at the university, 
plaintiff shall pay to her S500 per month as additional alimony. 
4. Except as set forth in this order, the original findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and decree of divorce entered January 14, 1992, shall remain in full force and effect. 
DATED this 7 ^ 3 a y of / f ( t u i 1995. 
1 B \ \ T H E COURT:. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
AMENDING DECREE OF DIVORCE ON REMAND to be delivered by hand to the 
following, this 14th day of February, 1995: 
Roger D. Sandack. Esq. 
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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